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Secession and International Law—Some Economic 
Problems in Relation to State Succession* 
J.-Maurice ARBOUR** 
Le 15 novembre 1976, le Parti Québécoss prenatt le pouvorr au Qué-
bec. Puisque l'objeciif majeur du gouvernement Lévesque est de conduire 
la province de Québec vers les chemins de l'indépendance, il convient 
d'ores et déjà de s'interrogrr sérieusement sur l'agenda d'éventuelles 
négociations entre, d'une part, un gouvernement mandaté pour faire la sé-
cession et, d'autre part, une équipe de négociateurs représentant le reste 
du Canada. Sans doute, l'un des points cruciaux d'un tel agenda serait la 
question du partage de l'actif et du passif de la Couronne aux droits du Ca-
nada. L'étude qui suit n'a pas d'autre objectif que d'analyser les données 
pertinentes du droit internaiionll sous ce rapport. 
Dans un premier chapitre, l'auteur examine le sort théorique que 
pourratt connattre la propriété publique fédéraee sise dans les limites géo-
graphiques du Québec. L'enquête démonrre deux choses. Premièrement, 
l'actif passe automatiquement à l'État nouveau et point n'est besoin, à cet 
égard, de la conclusion d'un accord spécia.. Deuxièmement, l'actif passe 
automatiquement à l'Etat nouveau, sans compensation aucune, à moins, 
bien entendu, que les parties ne se mettent d'accord sur le principe d'une 
compensation quelconque. 
Dans un second chapitre, l'auteur s'intéresee à la question de savoir si 
l'État nouveau serait obligé, en vertu du droit internaiional, à assumer une 
part quelconque de la dette publique canadienne. L'analyse démontre que 
la pratique des Etats, dans son ensemble, ne reconnatt pas l'existence 
d'une telle obligation, bien qu'elle ait sanctionné le principe d'une réparti-
tion à diverses occasion.. Toutefois, des considérations de justice et d'é-
* Cette étude a été originalement soumise comme thèse de maîtrise à la Harvard Law 
School. L'auteur tient à exprimer sa plus vive gratitude à l'endroit des professeurs 
Richard Baxter et Ronald Sheen ainsi qu'à Dean Weiner, Aviva Weiner, André Delisle 
et Monique Lessard qui, à des titres divers, ont collaboré à la préparation du manus-
crit. 
** Professeur à la Faculté de droit de l'Université Laval. 
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quité ont condutt la plupart des publicistes à reconnaître l'existenee d'une 
obligation morale à la charge de l'État nouveau. 
En droit strict, il sembleratt donc que le Québec n'auratt rien à débour-
ser pour l'actif qu'il recevratt automaiiquement et n'auratt rien à débour-
ser, également, au chapitre de la dette publique fédérale. Toutefois, l'exa-
men minutieux du fondement de ces curieuses solutions traditionnelles, 
selon lesquelles l'État sécessionniste succéderait à l'actif et non pas au 
passif de l'État prédécesseur, amène l'auteur à plaider pour une solution 
plus logique et plus juste aussi. Le problème réel, à ce niveau, consiste 
cependant à élaborer des critères de répartition qui seraient justes et équi-
tables pour les deux parties en présence; à cet égard, la pratique interna-
tionale n'offre pas de solution magique et tout laisse croire que la méthode 
la plus sûre est encore celle qui tiendratt compte d'indicateurs écono-
miques. 
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Introduction 
The problems and distinctions to be considered with regard to State suc-
cession. 
On November 15, 1976, the Parti Québécois, which advocates 
independence for the Province of Quebec and its French-speaking major-
ity, won control of the provincial government. The main commitment of 
the Parti Québécois is to lead the province out of the Canadian Federation, 
establishing Quebec as an independent nation and breaking up Canada as 
it now exists. For the time being, the Province of Quebec will be kept 
within Canada until such time as the population of Quebec can decide, by 
referendum, whether or not it wants independence. The importance of 
that referendum for Canada's future cannot be underestimated: there is a 
strong possibility, now, that an entirely new State will come into being 
through separation from Canada. In fact, there are very uncertain times 
ahead for Canada before the outcome is resolved. 
It goes without saying that the legal scholar has the task, here and 
now, of studying the various problems which would accompany the 
acquisition of national sovereignty by Quebec. Let us suppose it does 
happen, and Quebec peacefully chooses to go out of the Canadian Federa-
tion. What are then the effects of this political event upon the various 
legal situations stemming from the very fact that Quebec was a member of 
the Canadian Federation? For example, is the new State legally required 
to respect the 1954 agreement between Canada and the United States 
concerning the St. Lawrence Seaway1? Is the new State legally required 
to take over a proportional part of the Canadian public debt? What is the 
effect of a change of sovereignty on federal public property which is 
located within the new State? Is the new State obliged to respect the 
terms of a contract concluded before "Independence Day" between a 
private contractor and the Canadian Administration? Does international 
law have precise answers to these questions? 
In reality, it is under the label "State Succession"2 that international 
law deals with those problems, and it must be admitted not very success-
1. United States Treaties and other International Agreements, 1954, Vol. 5, p. 1784. 
2. The International Law Commission provisionally adopted the following definition of 
this term; it means " (. . .) the replacement of one State by another in the responsibil-
ity for the international relations of the territory." Draft Articles on Succession of 
States in respect of Treaties" Doc. A/8710/Rev.l, in: Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission (hereafter Yearbook. . .) (1972) vol. 11, p. 230. The same definition 
is used in respect of matters other than treaties; see: Yearbook. . . (1974) vol. 11, 
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fully. Indeed, there is probably no topic of international law more theoret-
ically confusing than that of State succession. Such a situation can have 
various explanations. 
First of all, international custom, as "evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law"3, is not easy to circumscribe because the practice of 
States is neither general nor uniform. Very often, solutions to a particular 
problem are the result of pure political or economic considerations. For 
example, a peaceful change of territorial sovereignty can engender a 
favourable attitude, in the new nation, to voluntarily agreeing to the 
devolution of rights and liabilities; on the contrary, an involuntary loss of 
a territory, in such a case as the secession of a province against the 
predecessor4 State's will, can have profound significance upon the terms 
of an agreement, if there is an agreement at all5. Economic factors may 
also dictate, to a great extent, the terms of negotiations; indeed, it is a 
truism to say that the successor6 State's capacity to pay, with respect to 
financial matters, is an important fact which cannot be underestimated7. 
Part I, p. 94, Doc. A/CN.4/282. We must remark that this term is used as referring to 
"the fact of replacement of one State by another, leaving aside any connotation of 
inheritance of rights or obligations on the occurrence of that event" 
(Doc. A/8710/Rev.l, ibid., p. 231). In municipal law, the term succession tends to 
carry the meaning of a legal institution which brings about by itself the transfer of legal 
rights and obligations; this is not necessarily the case in international law. On this 
particular question, see generally: Sir Humphrey WALDOCK, "First Report on Succes-
sion of States and Government in Respect of Treaties", Yearbook. . . (1968) Vol. II, 
p. 87, Doc. A/CN.4/202. 
3. See: Article 38, International Court of Justice Statute. 
4. "Predecessor State" means "the State which has been replaced by another on the 
occurrence of a succession of State" ("Draft Articles on Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties", Yearbook. . . (1972) Vol. II, p. 230, Doc. A/8710/Rev.l). 
5. Keith is one of the first writers, in modern literature, who emphased that distinction 
when he wrote: "(. . .) it is better to accept as the fundamental division that between 
(1) cases of cession and (2) cases of conquest, thus distinguishing the instances not on 
the basis of the extent to which the state is affected by the change, but on the basis of 
the mode in which the change comes about, by agreement or by force." A.B. KEITH, 
The Theory of State Succession with Special Referenee to English and Colonial Law, 
London, Waterloo and Sons Ltd, 1907, p. 1. See also: S. ROSENNE, "Effect of Change 
of Sovereignty Upon Municipal Law", (1950) B. Y.l.L. 272: "The manner in which the 
emancipation is achieved is of considerable legal importance, for it alone will determine 
whether or not the change involved a break in the chain of legal continuity." 
6. "Successor State" means the State which has replaced another State on the occur-
rence of a Succession of States": supra, note 4. 
7. See: D.P. O'CONNEL, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967, Vol. 1, p. 369: "Economic conside-
rations, it must be admitted, have obstruded to such an extent on the topic as to 
obscure whatever fundamental principles exist." 
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In other words, factual considerations, peculiar to each case, may pro-
duce different results. The solution which is reached in one bilateral 
treaty does not necessarily illustrate the feeling on the part of the two 
States that in acting as they did, they were fulfilling a legal obligation. As 
the International Court of Justice held in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Case: 
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice but they must also 
be such, or be carried out in such a way as to be evidence of a belief that this 
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The 
need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the 
very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. 
Moreover, even if it is assumed that the same solution to a particular 
problem may be present in a certain number of bilateral treaties, it should 
be constantly borne in mind that similar provisions in bilateral treaties 
between a predecessor State and a successor State do not establish, ipso 
facto, the existence of a rule of customary international law9. 
Nor is this an end to the difficulties. It should not be forgotten that 
State Succession—as a special field of inquiry—covers a broad variety of 
situations; there are, indeed, various types10 of State succession: creation 
of a new State, separation from an established State, partial cession of 
territory, extinction of a State, union of States, accession to indepen-
dence as a result of decolonization, and so on. From the standpoint of 
legal theory, it cannot be lightly assumed that the same rules of law 
necessarily apply to all these different situations. The dangers of generali-
zation are always present and I believe that the circumstances of different 
cases, which are rarely identical, must be taken into consideration. In this 
respect, it is significant that the International Law Commission decided to 
treat separately the special case of separation of part of a State (secession) 
in connection with its draft articles on succession of States in respect of 
treaties1 '. Of primary concern to the object of this paper is the question of 
whether or not the case of the emergence of new States as a result of 
decolonization after the Second World War is relevant to our discussion. 
8. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 44. 
9. See: R. BAXTER, "Treaties and Customs", (1970) 1 R.C.A.D.I. 24. 
10. For a brief presentation of the various classifications, see: A/CN.4/267, p. 65 and seq. 
11. Indeed, the International Law Commission uses the expression "newley indépendant 
State" which applies to any case of emergence to independence of a former dependent 
territory but which excludes cases concerning the emergence of a new State as a result 
of a separation of part of an existing State. "Draft Articles on Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties", Yearbook. . . (1972) Vol. II, p. 230-231, Doc. A/8710/Rev.l. 
Mr Bedjaoui, Special Rapporteur on Succession of States in matters other than 
treaties, decided to adopt the same approach: A/CN.4/267, p. 72. 
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To the extent that the independence of colonial territories is "a process 
constitutionally and sociologically distinguishable from the traditionnal 
forms of secession"12, it must be considered that the precedents afforded 
by these instances are completely irrelevant. On the other hand, to the 
extent that one is prepared to admit that Quebec's independence is the 
mere assertion of the right of its population to self-determination13, the 
differences between these two types of State succession can be 
minimized. As a matter of fact, there is only one reason why one can rely 
on precedents emanating from the emergence of new States as a result of 
decolonization: recent practice—as evidence of the opinio juris of 
today—is extremely rich in matters relating to new States emerging from 
a dependent territory but the same cannot be said for cases of secession. 
On the whole, and from a legal point of view, Quebec's secession is 
similar to the separation of the Congo from Belgium in I96014. This case 
may be correctly analysed as the one where a portion of the Belgian 
national territory, called Belgian Congo, seceded from the Belgian State 
in order to become a new State within the international community. In 
both cases, the basic elements which gave rise to questions of succession 
are identical, though political and economic factors may be different. 
However, I will respect the traditional and fundamental distinction 
which exists between partial and universal succession15. As it was 
pointed out by Hershey, the main difference between these two 
categories "(. . .) is that in case of partial succession there is a continuity 
of state life or personality on the part of the State which has lost a portion 
of its territory."16 Therefore, cases of annexation or fusion with another 
State shall be excluded from our investigation. 
This is the background against which some legal consequences of an 
eventual secession on the part of the Province of Quebec must be asses-
sed. The purpose of this paper is not to deal with all the various aspects of 
12. International Law Association, Commtteee on State Succession to Treaties and Other 
Governmental Obligations, London, 1965, p. 2. 
13. See: The independent opinion of Dr. Zourek, supra, note 12, p. XIV. 
14. This case is one example among many others since 1945. 
15. Succession is said to be partial "(. . .) when an existing State takes over (. . .) the 
sovereignty of a portion of territory formerly belonging to another State or again when 
a new State is formed by breaking off from a larger State ( . . . ) or when a State 
previously a member of a federal State or of a Confederation (. . .) obtains its complete 
independence." C. FENWICK, International Law, 3d Ed., London, Appleton-
Century-Crofts Inc., 1948, p. 152. On the other hand, succession is said to be universal 
when the whole territory of a State is acquired by one or several other States. 
16. A.S. HERSHEY, "The Succession of States", (1911) A.J.l... 289. 
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State succession17; its scope is more modest for it is strictly limited to 
questions relating to public property and debt. Within this framework, the 
objective is not so much a discussion about the precise content of the 
existing rules of law—a task which would be very ambitious, if not 
impossible18—as a search for general principles which could be applied in 
eventual negotiations on these issues. For this purpose careful attention 
will be paid both to theory and States' practice. 
In keeping with what has just been said, the present will take the 
following form: the first chapter will cover problems relating to the federal 
public property which is located within the territory of the new State, and 
the second will be concerned with the problematical question of the suc-
cessor State's obligation to take over a part of the Canadian public debt. 
1. Succession to public property 
Since State succession consists of the replacement of one 
sovereignty over a territory by another, it is important to consider the fate 
of federal public property which is located within the Province of Quebec. 
Among international law authorities'9, the prevailing view seems to be 
17. State succession, as a particular field of investigation, deals generally with such prob-
lems as succession in respect of treaties, problems of nationality, acquired rights, 
public debt and public property, international responsability and so forth. 
18. It is to be remembered that the International Law Commission decided, in 1967, to 
begin its study of Succession of States, by appointing Sir Humphry Waldock Special 
Rapporteur for Succession in respect of treaties and Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui Special 
Rapporteur for succession in respect of matters other than treaties. From 1968 to 1974, 
Mr. Bedjaoui submitted eight reports relating to Succession of States in economic and 
financial matters, more particularly on succession to public property. See: 
A/CN .4/204, A/CN.4/216/Rev.l, A/CN.4/226, A/CN.4/247, A/CN.4/259/Add.l, 
A/CN.4/267, A/CN.4/282, A/CN.4/292. Sir Waldock submitted, from 1968 to 1972, 
five reports: Yearbook. . . (1972) Vol. II, p. 224, Doc. A/8710/Rev.l. 
19. Inter alia: D.P. O'CONNEL, International Law, 2d Ed., London, Stevens and Sons, 
1970, Vol. 1, p. 387; J.G. STARKE, An Introduction to International Law, 6th Ed., 
London, Butterworths, 1967, p. 287; L. DELBEZ, Les principes généraux du droit 
international public, 3d Ed., Paris, Librairie générale du droit et de jurisprudence, 
1964, p. 277; A. BONDE, Traité élémentaire de droit international public, Paris, Dal-
loz, 1926, p. 120; L. CAVARÉ, Le droit international public positif, 3d Ed., by J.P. 
QUENEUDEC, Paris, Pedone, 1967, p. 378; PRADIER-FODERE, Traité de droit interna-
tional public, Paris, Pedone-Lauriel, 1885, Tome 1, p. 276; C. ROUSSEAU, Droit 
international public, 7th Ed., Paris, Dalloz, 1973, p. 176; M. SIBERT, Traité de droit 
international public, Paris, Dalloz, 1951, Tome 1, p. 213; A.B. KEITH, op. cit.,supra, 
note 5 p. 49; CASTREN, "La succession d'états", (1951) R.C.A.D.I. 455; P. GUG 
GENHEIM, Traité de droit international public, Genève, Librairie de llUniversité, 1953, 
Tome 1, p. 466; BRIERLY, The Law of Nations, 6th Ed. by Sir Humphrey Waldock, 
Oxford, 1963, p. 156. 
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that the successor State becomes possessor of the public property of the 
predecessor State which relates to the seceding territory. The most com-
mon argument put forward in support of this rule appears to be that this 
right is an integral part of the exercise of sovereignty. Indeed, it is gener-
ally said that it would be inconceivable that the predecessor State might 
maintain property rights in assets which are necessary to the new State in 
order to carry out its general activity. Things like public harbors, customs 
houses, post offices, prisons and military buildings would consequently 
pass to the successor State. However, it is true that opinions vary as to 
the exact extent and the precise conditions under which such a succession 
takes place. For instance, does it mean that the successor State is entitled 
to receive all public property, of whatever type or class, used or posses-
sed by the predecessor State? Does it mean that such property must pass 
automatically, without compensation, to the successor State? In order to 
clarify the situation, it may be useful to consider (see Part 1.1.) if there 
exists a general principle, recognized by the practice of States, which 
requires complete devolution of State property to the successor State. If 
such a rule does exist, it will then be necessary to determine to what 
extent and under which conditions such a rule operates. Part 1.2. will 
analyse special problems which arise in the application of the rule while 
Part 1 3 will deal with the question of compensation 
1.1. The existence of the rule of succession 
One of the most difficult and practically important questions that 
must be resolved in the following section is whether or not such a general 
rule as the automatic passing of State property from the predecessor State 
to the successor State exists in the realm of international law. In order to 
answer that question in the most accurate method, I shall follow Brierly's 
sound counsel when he says: "Evidence that a custom in this sense exists 
in the international sphere can be found only by examining the practice of 
States."20 I will proceed by examining the practice of States in this re-
spect, however tedious such an exercise can be. 
The practice that public property passes to the successor State takes 
its roots in the early history of international law. Indeed, treaties signed as 
early as the eighteenth century give proof of that fact. For example, by 
Article 4 of the Treaty of Peace of February 1763 between France, Great 
Britain and Spain, France "(. . .) cedes and guaranties to his said Britan-
nic Majesty, in full rights, Canada with all its dependencies (. . .) and in 
20. BRIERLY, supra, note 19, p. 59. 
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general, everything that depends on the said country" 2I Twenty years 
later, the same practice was embodied in the first Article of the Treaty of 
Peace between Great Britain and the United States : for himself, his heirs 
and successors, His Britannic Majesty "(• • •) relinquishes all claims to 
the government, property and territorial rights (. . .)"2 2 of the newly in-
dependent State. These two cases of forced cessions of territory, though 
they have an historical importance, reflect more a solution imposed by 
armed force than the mere application of a general principle of law. On 
this point, the formation of the Kingdom of Belgium, in 1830, offers a case 
where such a reservation may not be entertained; indeed, when Belgium 
separated from Holland, it was finally agreed that: 
Les ouvrages d'utilité publique ou particulière tels que canaux, routes ou autres 
de semblable nature, construits en tout ou en partie aux frais du Royaume des 
Pays-Bas, appartiendront, avec les avantages et les charges qui y sont attachées, 
au pays où ils sont situés.23 
The same principle was applied by the Treaty of Peace between the 
U.S.S.R. and Finland, in 1920: 
Les biens appartenant à l'Etat russe et aux institutions gouvernementales russes 
et se trouvant en Finlande passent sans indemnité en toute propriété à l'Etat 
finlandais.44 
When the United States of America recognized the independence of the 
Republic of the Philippine Islands, in 1946, a similar provision was intro-
duced into the Treaty of general relations between the two parties. 
Article 1 provided: 
The United States of America agrees to withdraw and surrender and does hereby 
withdraw and surrender, all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, con-
trol or sovereignty existing and exercised by the United States of America in and 
over the territory and the people of the Philippine Islands.25 
Perhaps the most interesting case is the Indian one in 1947. Firstly, as 
India gained independence, the problem of British public property located 
21. Defenitive treaty of peace between France, Great Britain and Spain (signed at Paris, 
February 10, 1763), in: PARRY, Vol. 42, p. 320. 
22. Definitive treaty of peace between Great Britain and The United States, (signed at 
Paris, September 3, 1783), in: Idem, Vol. 48, p. 487. 
23. Article 15, Traité du 19 avril 1839 entre la Belgique et la Hollande, relatif à la 
séparation de leurs territoires respectifs, in: G. MARTENS, Nouveau recueil de traiiés, 
T. XVI, p . 773. 
24. Article 22, Traité de la Paix entre la Répubiique de Finlande et la République 
Socialiste Federative des soviets de Russie, League of Nations Treaty Series, 1921, 
Vol. 3, p. 5. 
25. Treaty of general relations between the Repubiic of the Philippine and the United 
States of America, in: Treaties and other International Agreements of the United 
States of America, vol. II, p. 3. 
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in former British India was significant. It was solved in the following 
manner: all property which, immediately before Independence Day, had 
been vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the exercice of the func-
tions of the Crown in its relationship with the Indian States was vested, 
without compensation, "in His Majesty for the purposes of the 
Governor-General-in-Council"26. Secondly, with the division of India 
into two independent States, both India and Pakistan became successor 
States in relation to the former undivided India. According to Article 9 of 
the Indian Independence Act, the general principle of division of powers, 
rights and property of the Governor-General-in-Council was fully consec-
rated between these two Dominions27. This rule was subsequently recog-
nized by a comprehensive financial settlement between the two parties28, 
and also embodied in an Order made under the authority of the Indian Inde-
pendence Act29. 
The Indonesian and Singapore cases are two other examples where 
the rule of succession to public property was recognized. In the first case, 
it was agreed that (. . .)"all rights and obligations of Indonesia, under 
private and public law, are "ipso jure" transferred to the republic of the 
United States of Indonesia, unless otherwise provided for."30 In the sec-
ond case, when the Government of Malaysia relinquished its sovereignty 
in respect of Singapore, it was enacted that "all property, movable and 
immovable", which belonged to the government of Singapore before its 
union with Malaysia, was to become once again the property of Sing-
apore3 '. 
French practice, in relation to its former dependent colonies also 
gives evidence of the same rule. For example, by virtue of article 33 of the 
Agreement of June 19, 1961, the Republic of Mauritania "(. . .) exerce 
26. The Crown Representative (Transfer of Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947, G.G.O. 
no 10. 
27. Indian Independence Act, 1947, 10-11 Geo. 6, C. 30, Art. 9: "The Governor-General 
shall by order make such provision as appears to him to be necessary or expedient 
(. . .)—(b) for dividing between the new Dominions (. . .). The powers, rights, prop-
erty, duties and liabilities of the Governor-General-in Council (. . . ) " 
28. At the best of our knowledge, this agreement was never published. However, exten-
sive details ofthat accord are reported in: Keesingss Contemporary Archive,, Vol. 6, 
Part. 2, p. 3611. 
29. The Indian Indépendance (Rights, Property and Liabiliiies) Order, 1947, G.G.O. 
no 18, Art. 4 and 6: "All land, goods, coins, bank notes and currency must be attri-
buted either to India or Pakistan according to their actual locality." 
30. Article 4, Agreement on Transitional Measure,, November 2, 1949, in U.N.T.S. 
Vol. 69, p. 267. 
31. Article 9, Malaysia Law No 53 of 1965, reproduced in (1965) 4 I.L.M. 938. 
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sur le domaine public et privé en Mauritanie tous les droits de toute nature 
exercés antérieurement par la République française qui y renonce 
expressément."32 The agreement between the French Republic and 
Senegal concerning State property, article 1, embodies this same idea: 
"(• • •) est transférée au Sénégal la propriété des dépendances domaniales 
immatriculées sur son territoire au nom de la République française."33 
In view of the evidence, it must be admitted that common practice 
with regard to the transfer of public property to the successor State is 
largely sanctioned. The examples cited above represent only a few cases 
among numerous examples34. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Per-
manent Court of International Justice, in the Pazmany University Case3S 
32. Journal Officiel de la Répubiique Française, in: J.O.R.F., February 6, 1972, p. 1330. 
33. Convention relative au règlement domanial entre le Gouvernement de la République 
Française et le Gouvernement de la Répubiique du Sénéga,, in: J.O.R.F., March 21, 
1963, p. 2720. 
34. Ethiopia: Article 34, Italian Peace Treaty: "Italy formally renounces in favour of 
Ethiopia all property (apart from normal diplomatic or consular promises) rights, 
interests and advantages of all kinds acquired at any time in Ethiopia by the Italian 
State", in: Israel, Vol. IV, p. 2436. Trieste: Annex X, Italian Peace Treaty: "The free 
territory of Trieste shall receive without payment, Italian State and para-statal prop-
erty within the free territory", in: Idem, p . 2502. Lybia: Resolution 388 (V) of 
December 15, 1950 of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Official Records, 
Fifth Session, Supp. no 20. (A/1775)): Article 1: Lybia shall receive, without pay-
ment, the movable and immovable property located in Libya owned by the Italian 
State either in its own name or in the name of the Italian administration of Libya. 
Federation of Malaysia: Constitution of the Federaiion of Malaysia, Article 166: 
"Subject to the provisions of this Article, all property and assets immediately, before 
Merdeka Day, were vested in Her Majesty (. . .) vest in the Federation", in: ST/Leg. 
Sec. B/14, p. 84. Western Samoa: Constitution of the Independent State of Western 
Samoa, Article 123: "All property which immediately before Independence Day is 
vested in Her Majesty the Queen (. . .) shall (. . .) vest in Western Samoa", /«: St/Leg. 
Sec. B/14, p . 117, Cyprus: Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Repubiic of 
Cyprus, Annex E, Section 1: "All property of the Government of the Colony of C-
yprus shall on the date of entry into force of this treaty, become (. .) the property of 
the Republic of Cyprus", in: U.N.T.S., Vol. 382, p. 130. Algeria. Declaraiion of 
Principles concerning Economcc and Financial Cooperaiion, Article 19: "Public real 
estate in Algeria will be transferred to the Algerian State excepting with the agree-
ment of the Algerian authorities the premises deemed necessary for the normal func-
tionning of temporary or permanent services", in: (1963) 57 A.J.I.L. Mali Federation: 
Accord de coopération en matière économique, monétaire et financière Article 36: 
"La propriété de toutes les dépendances domaniales immatriculées au nom de la 
République Française sera transférée à la République gabonaise" in: J.O.R.F. 
November 24 1960 p. 10486. 
35. Appeal from a judgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak mixed arbitral tribunal (The 
Peter Pazmany Universtty v. The State of Czechoslovakia) Hungary v. Czechos-
lovakia, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, no 61. 
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found that the first paragraph of Article 191 of the Treaty of Trianon*6 was 
applying the "generally accepted law of State succession". Similarly, the 
United Nations Tribunal for Libya, in its decision of February 31, 195337, 
was of the opinion that the principles set forth in the following excerpts 
from the French writer Fauchille constituted a generally accepted rule of 
international law. Indeed, Fauchille wrote that: 
When a dismenbered State cedes a portion of its territory, property which consti-
tutes public property, namely property which by its nature is used for a public 
service existing on the annexed territory passes with its inherent characteristics 
and legal status to the annexing State.38 
Thus, there seems to be little doubt among international law writers 
that the new sovereign succeeeds to the public property. Moreover, prac-
tice of States is to the same effect and international jurisprudence gives 
the doctrine ample recognition. Considering the evidence, it must be ad-
mitted that the International Law Commission did not start a legal revolu-
tion when it provisionally approved this substantive rule in Article 8 of 
the draft Articles on succession of States in respect to matters other than 
treaties39. On the whole, then, I am firmly convinced that if there was 
only one custom in this extremely and confusing question of State succes-
sion, this custom would be that the successor State inherits the public 
property of the predecessor State. In the words of the International Law 
Commission, a succession of States "(. . .) entails the extinction of the 
rights of the predecessor State and the arising of the rights of the succes-
sor State."40 
36. Article 191(1): "States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is 
transferred and States arising from dismemberment of that Monarchy shall acquire all 
property and possessions situated within their territories belonging to the former or 
existing Hungarian Government." 
37. Report of International Arbitral Awards, United Nations, Vol. XII., p. 362. 
38. Translation of the excerpt in: Doc. A/CN.4/232, Supplement prepared by the Sec-
retariat, to the "Digest of the decisions of international tribunals relating to State 
succession", see: Yearbook. . ., 1970, Vol. II, p. 173. 
39. See: "Seventh Report on Succession of States in Respect of Matters other than 
Treaties", by Mr. M. BEDJAOUI, Special Rapporteur, Doc. A/CN.4/282; 
Yearbook. . ., 1974, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 91. 
40. Doc. A/CN.4/282, supra, note 39, Article 6. See also Foreign Affairs French 
Minister's Declaration in: [1974] A.F.D.I. 1072: "L'existence même d'un nouvel Etat 
implique, suivant la règle du droit international public de la succession d'Etats, que la 
quasi-totalité du domaine public de l'Etat prédécesseur devienne partie intégrante de 
l'Etat successeur." 
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1.2. The scope and content of the rule of succession 
The complete harmony between practice of States and doctrine 
about the existence of the rule of automatic devolution of the public 
property of the predecessor State to the successor State must not, how-
ever, hide the real difficulties in trying to apply such a rule. The interna-
tional legal problems traditionally associated with it are those of the dis-
tinction between private and public domain of State and the proper defini-
tion that should be given to the expression "public domain". 
1.2.1. The traditional distinction between public and private domain 
It would seem that the traditional distinction between public and 
private domain is closely linked to the legal question of compensation41. 
Indeed, it is often said, that the public domain of the predecessor State 
passes to the successor State, without compensation, while the private 
domain does not42. For instance, a representative of this view states his 
opinion as follows: 
As regards private State property, i.e. property which the State possesses in the 
same manner as a private person, in order to derive income from it, it must be 
noted that failing any special provision it does not become part of the property of 
the annexing State.43 
The same writer exposes the reasons for this rule in the following manner: 
In spite of the loss the dismembered State has suffered, it remains the same 
person as before and does not, any more than a private person, cease to be the 
owner of the things it possesses in the annexed territory and there is no principle 
preventing it from having the ownership of immovable property in that 
territory.44 
The consequences of this distinction are very clear: the successor State 
has no right to appropriate for itself property which, under the law of the 
predecessor State, was considered private property of that State. If it 
41. We shall discuss this question in Part 1.3. 
42. R. SELOSSE, Traité de l'annexion au territoire françass et son démembrement, Paris, 
L. Larose, 1880, p. 180 and seq;; A. CAVAGLIERI, Effets juridiquss des changements 
de souveraineté territoriale, Rapport à l'Institut de Droit International, Session de 
Cambridge, Bruxelles, 1931, p. 24-25; L. CAVARÉ, supra, note 19, p. 278; C. ROUS-
SEAU, supra, note 19, p. 175; A. BONDE, supra, note 19, p. 120; P. GUGGENHEIM, 
supra, note 19, p. 468; L. DELBEZ, supra, note 19, p. 276; H. WHEATON, Elements of 
International Law, 6th Ed., Boston, by W.B. LAWRENCE, 1855, Vol. 1, p. 67. 
43. P. FAUCHILLE, Traité de droit internaiional public, 8th Ed., Paris, Rousseau & Cie, 
1925, Vol. 1, p. 361; translation from: Yearbook. . ., 1970, Vol. II, p. 173, 
Doc. A/CN.4/232. 
44. Ibid. 
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does appropriate such property, it does so as an act of sovereignty and is 
required, as in any other State appropriation of property, to pay a just 
compensation to the owner. In other words, the assets of the predecessor 
State which relate to its private domain do not pass to the successor State. 
It is true that such a distinction was applied in the practice of States, 
particularly in relation to the French practice45, and was qualified by an 
international tribunal as a distinction which was recognized by general 
international law46. However, the passing over of all the private domain 
of the predecessor State was sanctionned by various treaties, such as the 
Treaty of Versailles of June 191947, the Treaty of Trianon48 and many 
agreements between France and African countries49. In view of this con-
tradictory evidence, it would seem that this distinction is not universally 
accepted. Moreover, strong reasons stand against it, the first one having a 
close connection with the distinction between public acts and private acts 
in the law of State immunity: it is a concept of French administrative law. 
Indeed, in the administrative law of France, the property of the State is 
divided into two categories: the public domain, which is owned by the 
State in its public capacity (navigable waters, public roads, territorial sea) 
and the private domain, which is exploited by the State for a commercial 
45. Senegal: See J.G. GAUTRON, "Sur quelques aspects de la succession d'Etat au 
Sénégal, [1962] A.F.D.I. p. 836; Madagascar: See D. BARDONNET, "La succession 
d'Etats à Madagascar", Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970, 
p. 567; Algeria: See G. FOUILLOUX, "La succession aux biens publics français dans 
les Etats nouveaux d'Afrique", [1965] A.F.D.I. 890 and seq.: LEBANON: See the 
agreement of March 1949, between France and Lebanon concerning monetary and 
financial relations between the two countries in: U.N.T.S., Vol. 173, p. 101, Article 8: 
"The French Government shall transfer and the Lebanese Government shall accept 
the promises listed in Annex 1, in their present stage, the total value of which shall be 
fixed at the lump sum of 18 million Lebane pounds, which shall be credited to France 
and debited to Lebanon." See also, generally: D.P. O'CONNELL, "States Succession 
in Relation to New States", (1970) 2 R.C.A.D.l. 169. It should be borne in mind, also 
that Israel did not succeed to the "private" domain of Great Britain: Article 2(a) of the 
agreement between the United Kingdom and Israel for the settlement of financial 
matters outstanding as a result of the termination of the mandate for Palestine; see 
U.K. Treaty Series no 26(1950), C.M.D. 7941. 
46. United Nations Tribunal in Libya, Report of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XII, 
p. 362. 
47. Article 257, see ISRAEL, supra, note 34, Vol. 2, p. 1424. 
48. Idem, Vol. Ill, p. 1863. 
49. Mauritania: Agreement between the French Republic and Mauritania concerning 
State property.Article 1, "La république française confirme le transfert à titre définitif 
à la république islamique de Mauritanie de ses droits sur tous les immeubles ayant 
constitué le domaine public ou le domaine privé de l'Etat français". (Text of this 
agreement in: [19(A]R.G.D.I.P. 304. 
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or industrial purpose. The effect of this situation is that legal questions 
concerning the private domain are governed by rules of private law. It 
must be admitted that such a distinction is unknown in British law and 
consequently, in Canadian law and Quebec law also. In fact, it would be 
very difficult, if not impossible, in the event of a State succession in 
Canada, to apply this terminology because there is only one category of 
State property, i.e. public property which is the property of Her Majes-
ty50. The second reason which indicates that this distinction must not be 
supported is the fact that it is not always easy to distinguish whether or 
not a particular property should be classified as private domain or public 
domain. This problem may explain, to a certain extent, why even France 
did not completely follow this pattern in its negotiations with various 
African States51. For all these reasons, it is my opinion that the Special 
Rapporteur to the International Law Commission is right when he does 
not formulate rules based on that distinction52. In any event the political 
inconvenience of having a foreign power as the owner of a private domain 
within the territory of another State could seem a sufficient reason for 
disregarding such a distinction 
However, this traditional distinction between private and public do-
main should not be underestimated. From a political viewpoint, it means 
that some States are not completely ready to transfer their property rights 
without fair compensation. This distinction demonstrates various impor-
tant economic interests which can be involved; it is my submission that 
this very fact may explain, to a certain extent, why so many writers, 
particularly French writers, consider the distinction a sound one. The 
magniture of this problem is clearly illustrated by the special case of 
public establishments or public (governmental) corporations. 
50. See: R. DUSSAULT, Traité de droit administratif canadien et québécois, Québec, 
P.U.L., 1974, Tome 1, p. 514. 
51. See: D. BARDONNET, La succession d'Etats à Madagascar, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1970, 
p. 567 and seq. 
52. Third Report on Succession in Respect of Matters other than Treaties, Yearbook. . ., 
1970, Vol. II, p. 131, Doc. A/CN.4/226. As Mr. Bedjaoui expressed himself: "The 
distinction between public domain and private domain is unsatisfactory not only be-
cause it does not exist in all legal systems but also because it does not cover public 
property in a uniform and identical manner from country to country", in: Sixth Report 
(. . .), Yearbook. . ., 1973, Vol. 2, p. 22, Doc. A/CN.4/267. And again: "Bearing in 
mind that neither the writers nor judicial decisions have exhausted discussion on the 
question whether property in the private domain of the State is transferable ipso jure 
on the same grounds as property in its public domain, the Special Rapporteur sought to 
avoid this distinction", in: Fifth Report (. . .),Yearbook. . ., 1972, Vol. II, p. 62; 
Doc. A/CN.4/259. 
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1.2.2. Property owned or possessed by public corporations 
A difficult question arises when it is a question of whether the suc-
cessor State may take over property, rights and interests owned or pos-
sessed by public corporations. In his Sixth Report, Mr. Bedjaoui made 
the following proposition regarding this: 
The successor State shall be automatically and fully subrogated to the patrimo-
nial rights which the predecessor State possesses in public establishments 
situated in the transferred territory.53 
However, the Special Rapporteur recognized that such a rule, although 
clear and logical, does not represent a firm rule of customary international 
law. As a matter of fact, the practice of States is less than uniform be-
cause it shows cases of automatic and complete succession along with 
cases of succession on condition of purchase. For example, although the 
Italian Peace Treaty made it quite clear that successor States must re-
ceive, without compensation, para-statal property located within the ac-
quired territory, i.e. movable and immovable property of public institu-
tions and public owned companies54, the same solution was not applied in 
relation to Lebanon and Algeria. Lebanon had to pay 80,000 pounds for 
the transfer of the Lebanese telephone system and 150,000 pounds for 
Beirut radio broadcasting station55. Payment was also provided for Air 
Algeria56. 
It is true that international law does not offer autonomous criteria for 
determining what constitutes public property57, and that due recourse to 
municipal law is necessary in order to answer this problem. However, 
from a logical standpoint, there is no valid reason why one may be au-
thorized to make an exception to the general principle of succession sole-
ly on the basis that such a property belongs to a public corporation. In 
reality, to the extent that such property belongs to the State and is used 
for the general interest of all population, it is difficult to understand why it 
should not follow the legal destiny of public domain. I think it is fair to say 
that public establishments were often viewed as properties pertaining to 
the private domain of the State, and were therefore excluded from the 
53. A/CN.4/267, p . 62. 
54. ISRAEL, supra, note 34, Vol. VI, Annex X, p. 2502. 
55. Agreement between France and Lebanon concerning monetary and financial relations 
between the two countries, U.N.T.S., Vol. 173, p. 101. 
56. Protocoee relatif à la coopération technique entre l'Etat françass et l'Etat algérien 
dans le domaine des travaux publics, des transports et du tourisme, J.O.R.J., 
October 6, 1962, p. 9660. 
57. FRANCO-ITALIAN CONCILIATION COMMISSION, "Dispute regarding property belong-
ing to the order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus", [1965] A.F.D.I. 319. 
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general transfer. In any case, if the particular framework of Canadian 
administrative law is kept in mind, difficulties quickly vanish. Indeed, 
many Canadian statutes expressly provide that property actually posses-
sed by various public corporations is vested in Her Majesty in right of 
Canada. Such provisions are usually present when public establishments 
are governmental agencies. Examples of this general tendency are given 
by the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority Acts,, The National Harbors 
Boards Act59 and the Broadcasting Act60. Under this last statute, Radio 
Canada is an agent of Her Majesty, and property acquired by the 
Corporation is the property of Her Majesty. Sometimes, statutes do not 
expressly state that a particular public corporation is an agent of Her 
Majesty but do make an express provision for the legal status of public 
property. For example, article 57 of the Government Railways ActbX 
states that all government railways and works connected therewith are 
"public works of Canada" ; there is no reason therefore to classify these 
properties into a special category since they are Crown properties and as 
such subject to the general rule reserved to State property It follows 
from,this that all properties used or possessed by Crown Corporations62 
would pass automatically to the successor State These properties in-
clude inter alia property owned by Air Canada Radio Canada and bv 
the National Capital Commission the National Battlefield Commission 
the National Harbors Board Canadian National Polymer Corporation 
and by the St Lawrence Sea'way Authority 
1.2.3. The link with the territory 
If the rule is that State property passes from the predecessor State to 
the successor State without regard to the distinction between private and 
public domain, we still have to incorporate in this rule certain qualifi-
cations. On the one hand, that does not mean that everything which is 
found within the seceding territory becomes, ipso facto, property of the 
new State. On the other hand, it does not follow that only tangible assets 
are subject to that rule. According to O'Connell, the most that could be 
said is that: 
58. R.S.C. 1970, C.S-1. 
59. R.S.C. 1970, C. N-8. 
60. R.S.C. 1970, C. B-ll. 
61. R.S.C. 1970, C. G-ll. 
62. "Crown Corporation" means a corporation that is ultimately accountable, through a 
Minister, to Parliament of the conduct of its affairs. A list of these corporations is 
provided by the Financial Administration Act, R.C.S. 1970, Shedules B, C and D. 
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only such property as certains to sovereignty and only such part of it as is 
identified with ceded or annexed or seceding territory can be claimed by a 
successor State ipso jure.63 
This statement contains two major qualifications; the first one is that 
only property appertaining to sovereignty over the territory should de-
volve automatically to the successor State. It is to be remembered that 
Mr. Bedjaoui proposed the same qualification in his Third and Sixth 
Report64, but discussions within the International Law Commission put it 
aside65. It was found, indeed, that this qualification was a vestige of the 
old distinction between private and public domain of the State and, further-
more, that the term "sovereignty" had too relative a meaning to be a 
standard measure66. 
The second qualification suggested by O'Connell tends to establish a 
close link between the territory and the property which is transferred to 
the new State. There is no doubt that properties such as canals, lands, 
public harbors, light houses and piers, bridges, dams, aerodromes, rail-
ways, custom houses, post offices and all other public buildings are 
closely related to the territory. But difficulties arise when the fate of 
movable property is considered; for example it may happen that property 
of the predecessor State is accidentally located within the seceding terri-
tory at the date of the succession of States. In that case, the practice of 
States or international jurisprudence is not of much help in answering the 
problem. However, a fair solution can be reached if we resort to analogy. 
Both in civil law and common law, legal theory usually distinguishes 
between res mobiles and res immobiles ; both systems also say that in 
certain circumstances a chattel becomes affixed to the freehold so as to 
63. O'CONNEL, supra, note 7, Vol. 1, p. 199. 
64. A/CN.4/226: "Property appertaining to sovereignty shall devolve, automatically and 
without compensation, to the successor State" (Art. 2) and A/CN.4/267, Article 5: 
"Public property means all property (. . .) which are necessary for the exercice of 
sovereignty by the successor State in the said territory." Later, Mr. Bedjaoui will 
submit a new proposal on the basis of which the I.L.C. discusses: "State property 
necessary for the exercice of sovereignty over the territory to which the Succession of 
States relates shall pass the predecessor State to the successor State" new 
Article 9—Yearbook. . ., 1975, Vol. I, p. 74. 
65. See: 1318th, 1319th and 1320th meetings, Yearbook. . ., 1975, Vol. I, p. 73 and seq. 
66. The version finally proposed by the Drafting Committee is a s follows: "Subject to the 
articles of the present part and unless otherwise agreed or decided, State property 
which, on the date of the Succession of States, is situated in the territory to which the 
Succession of States relates, shall pass to the successor State." See: 1329th meeting, 
Yearbook. . .,1975, Vol. I, p. 126. The Commission then approved this new formula. 
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become part of the freehold67, The essential idea is that moveables may 
become immoveables by their destination on the ground that what is 
annexed in permanence to the land becomes part of the land. It is my 
opinion that the same basic distinction may be used effectively in this 
case: federal property which is temporarily allocated to the seceding area, 
such as military vehicles or vessels while in transit across the territory, 
should not be subject to the rule of transfer. 
A second series of problems, in relation to the definition and 
determination of State property, concerns more specifically public funds 
and incorporeal rights. 
1.2.4. Public Funds 
It may be recalled the Pakistan (Monetary System and Reserve 
Bank) Order, in working out the transitional provisions for the monetary 
system of Pakistan, prescribed succession to public funds as follows: 
The Government of India shall pay to the Government of Pakistan an amount 
which bears to the Government's bank profits the same proportion as the total 
value of Pakistan notes in circulation in Pakistan (. . .)68 
The question can then be asked whether the successor State may be 
entitled to claim a part of the predecessor State's public funds. As it was 
pointed out by Mr. Bedjaoui, 
The part of the territory transferred may be fairly substantial and there is no 
reason why the remaining territory alone should retain the public funds and the 
treasury in their entirety.69 
However, this position raises serious difficulties. On the one hand, 
there is no doubt that the successor State, by virtue of its territorial 
jurisdiction, may appropriate for itself funds emanating from former fed-
eral activities over the territory. It is my submission that it is a valid 
exercise of its territorial jurisdiction because there is no longer a legal link 
between the predecessor State and its former activities upon that terri-
tory. Consequently, revenues emanating from federal activities such as 
custom revenues, post office revenues and funds specially allocated to the 
seceding territory such as currency and monetary tokens of all kinds 
should pass, from the date of the succession of States, to the new State. 
One may even say that such funds pass to the successor State pursuant to 
67. Quebec Civil Code, Article 375 and seq.; ANGER and HONSBERGER, Canadian Law of 
Real Property, Toronto, Canada Law Book Co., 1959, p. 453 and seq. 
68. G.G.O. no 21, August 14, 1947, Part. IV, par. 1. 
69. A/CN.4/267, p. 57. 
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the general rule that public property located within the seceding area is 
automatically transferred to the new State. On the other hand, it is not 
necessarily true that the predecessor State might be willing to make an 
apportionment of central funds which remain under its territorial juris-
diction. If, as it is suggested by O'Connell, "(• • •) it is perhaps just that a 
successor State should acquire such proportion of these funds as is rep-
resented by the contributions of the absorbed territory (. . .)"7 0 , the ques-
tion remains highly political and the solution may depend on whether or 
not the secession takes place with the consent of the predecessor State. It 
is true that Mr. Bedjaoui, in his Sixth Report, recommended that the State 
fortune, i.e. its public funds and treasury assets, should be apportioned 
between the predecessor State and the secessionist State71. However, it 
would seem that he came to a more realistic position on this point when he 
proposed a new article based directly on the practice relating to newly 
independent States: the assets and holdings of the territory which have 
been allocated by the predecessor State to the secessionist State should 
pass now to the successor State72. For the purpose of this paper, this 
means for example, that paper money which is normally in circulation in 
the Province of Quebec, on Independence Day, would now be vested to 
the new State. But it is wrong to assert, as Mr. Bedjaoui did, that the 
currency left in circulation in the territory by the predecessor State and 
retained temporarily by the successor State "(. .) justifies the latter in 
claiming the gold and foreign exchange security or backing for that 
currency."73 Indeed, I do not understand the Special Rapporteur when he 
writes that "(. .) currency has value only through the existence of its 
gold backing (. .)"7 4 ; such an assertion was true before World War I 
under the Gold Exchange Standard but is not true under the world 
monetary system as it exists today7s. 
On the whole, it is my opinion that apportionment of public funds is 
closely related to the more fundamental problem of succession of one 
monetary system to another. There is no doubt at all that international 
70. O'CONNEL, supra, note 63, Vol. 1, p. 205. 
71. A/CN.4/267, p. 57. 
72. Yearbook. . ., 1974, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 114, Doc. A/CN.4/282. 
73. Ibid., p. 104. 
74. Ibid. 
75. See: YEAGER, International Monetary Relations: Theory, History and Policy, Harder 
and Row, New York. From April 1929 to April 1933, at least 35 countries left the gold 
standard: ibid., p. 344. Under the Bretton Woods System, gold became a reserve 
asset, as foreign currencies. In 1976, gold is a precious metal like many other precious 
metals. 
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sovereignty confers on the new State the right to introduce its own cur-
rency and to establish its own bank of issues. But until the successor State 
is able to issue its own money, the old currency will necessarily be in 
circulation and will be legal tender. In the Indian case, for example, the 
Pakistan (Monetary System and Reserve Bank) Order provided that the 
Reserve Bank of India was permitted to continue managing the currency 
of Pakistan and carrying on the banking business there until an agreed-
upon-date76. By this same order, the Indian rupee was considered as the 
standard monetary unit of Pakistan until the Pakistan Legislature pro-
vided its own currency. This particular aspect of a State's succession may 
present great technical difficulties which can be properly solved only by 
an appropriate financial agreement which provides for the conduct to be 
adopted during the transitional period. 
1.2.5. Incorporeal rights 
When it is said that the successor State succeeds to the public prop-
erty of the predecessor State, that does not mean that it will take over 
tangible property only. It would seem that this principle of succession 
extends to public rights of a pecuniary character, such as debt-claims 
which constitute the public resources of the State. Indeed, the Interna-
tional Law Commission provisionally adopted the following definition of 
State property which passes to the successor State: 
(. . .) State property means property, rights and interests which, on the date of 
the succession of States, were according to the internal law of the predecessor 
State, owned by that State.77 
It should be noted that this extension of the concept of public property is 
not a new discovery. This definition was already present in the Treaty of 
peace between Great Britain and the United States78, as well as in the 
Treaty of Versailles79, the Italian Peace Treaty60 and in the Indian Inde-
pendence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order81. Nevertheless, this 
76. G.G.O. no 21, published in: POPLAI, Select Documents, India 1947-1950, Vol. 1, 
p. 49. 
77. See Yearbook. . ., 1973, Vol. II, p. 202 and seq. 
78. Supra, note 23. See also the Treaty of Paris, February 10, 1763: "Moreover, his most 
Christian Majesty cedes and guaranties to his said Britannik Majesty, in full right, 
Canada, (. . .) with the sovereignty, property, possessions and all rights acquired by 
treaty or otherwise." 
79. ISRAEL, supra, note 34, p. 1449. 
80. Supra, note 34. 
81. Supra, note 29. See also: The Federation of Malaya Order 1 (Independence Order in 
Council), S.I. (1957) no. 1533; Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom 
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definition gives rise to interesting problems. For example, does this mean 
that all taxes and payments which had not been paid to the predecessor 
State before the day of independence have to be paid to the successor 
State? Does this mean that the predecessor State loses its rights over the 
matter or does this mean that fiscal debts are paid off? As a matter of fact, 
it is true that Israel received all taxes which had not been paid to the 
Government of Palestine82, but this case is not sufficient to prove the 
existence of a general practice in that sense. And it is a legitimate question 
to ask on which base the Special Rapporteur relied upon in suggesting that 
the successor State shall "(. . .) become the beneficiary of the public 
debts of all kinds receivable by the predecessor State."83 This proposal is 
rather amazing if one takes into account that it is not substantiated by a 
sound theory or not demonstrated by clear evidence of State practice84. 
Professor O'Connell's thesis seems more interesting when he points 
out that the successor State is entitled to these unpaid taxes because the 
debt relationship between the predecessor State and the debtor expires 
with the change of nationality of the debtor and the loss of sovereign 
authority over him86. Nevertheless, this case is not completely convinc-
ing; while it is true that the predecessor State loses jurisdiction to enforce 
its laws within the new foreign State as well as jurisdiction to prescribe 
new laws on the basis of nationality of the individual, who is now a foreign 
citizen86, this legal situation does not necessarily mean that the new State 
should be completely free vis-à-vis the predecessor State. From the point 
of view of strict logic, there is no apparent reason why unpaid taxes 
should not be assigned according to the date of independence. A strong 
case can be made, indeed, that there is a legal obligation to pay an unpaid 
tax to the right person entitled to receive that payment and that there is a 
public duty to pay full amount of the money required by the predecessor 
State in order to achieve its general purposes. 
of Great Britain and the Provisional Government of Burma Regarding the Recognition 
of Burmese Independence and Related Matters, U.N.T.S. Vol. 70, p . 184; BAXTER 
and SOHN, "Draft convention on the International Responsability of States for Injuries 
to Aliens", (1961) 54 A.J.l... 548, Article 10; Case concerning the Barcelona Trac-
tion, Light and Power Co. Ltd, (1970) I.C.J. Rep. 3, par. 53. 
82. See: Materials on Succession of States, ST/LEG./Ser.B14/P. 50. 
83. Yearbook. . ., 1973, Vol. II, p. 28, Doc. A/CN.4/267. 
84. In fact, Mr. Bedjaoui's proposal relies upon the notion of sovereignty of the new State. 
This concept is very interesting but it does not tell us why we should "sacrify" 
sovereignty of the predecessor State without further discussion! 
85. O ' C O N N E L L Op. cit, supra, note 7, p. 190. 
86. State succession present difficult problems in relation to nationality. As we do not deal 
with those problems in this paper, we shall assume that change of nationality is au-
tomatic. 
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However, political realities can dictate another solution: citizens of 
the new State and the new State itself have a real interest in keeping that 
money within their territory. Few tax payers enjoy paying more taxes 
than necessary and few tax payers would enjoy paying taxes to a State 
from which they had just seceded. A fair compromise might be reached if 
one takes into consideration the time factor in that issue. Taxes which 
were owed to the predecessor State before one year preceding Indepen-
dence Day should be paid to that State: practically, this suggestion means 
that amounts which could be recovered after suits before federal tribunals 
should be returned to the predecessor State. Enforcement problems could 
be easily settled by administrative arrangements between the two parties. 
On the contrary, all assessments made during the year which precedes 
Independence Day should be paid to the successor State, subject, how-
ever, to the following exception: taxes already paid to the predecessor 
State during the year preceding Independence Day would not be subject 
to a legal claim by the successor State This suggestion could be applied in 
relation to other aspects of public debt-claims 
1.3. Considerations concerning compensation 
1.3.1. The practice of States 
If the rule, then, is that the successor State succeeds to the property 
of the predecessor State without regard to this dichotomy between its 
private or public domain, there is still the question of whether or not the 
successor State receives it without compensation. On this point, States 
practice, as might be expected, reveals neither consensus among States 
nor a pattern of conformity between terms of settlement. In the Indian 
case for example, the Government of India agreed to pay 100 million 
rupees in respect of all defence stores and fixed assets which were the 
property of the United Kingdom and which were taken over by the 
Government of India87. The same can be said about the Israel case: the 
Government of the United Kingdom transferred its rights and interests in 
assets but Israel agreed to pay the sum of 5,882,000 pounds in payment of 
other commercial debts and for the assets to be transferred88. Perhaps it 
87. Exchange of letters between the United Kingdom and India extending the financial 
agreement of August 14, 1947, and making certain financial provisions in respect of 
defense stores and installations taken over from the Government of United Kingdom, 
London, July 9, 1948, in (1948) 1 Slate Papers 811. 
88. Agreement between the United Kingdom and Israel for the settlement of financial 
matters outstanding as a result of the termination of the mandate for Palestine, supra, 
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was considered, in these two cases, that these properties belonged to the 
private domain of the United Kingdom; such a consideration, however, 
would be very surprising if it was because Her Majesty does not enjoy a 
private domain as it is understood by French law89. 
Again, under the peace treaties of 1919, the general practice—with 
one exception—has been that public property was to be paid for by the 
acquiring State. Article 142 of the Treaty ofNeullly and Article 191 of the 
Treaty of Trianon provide that any power to which territory was ceded 
should acquire all property and possessions situated within such territory. 
The value of such property and possessions so acquired shall be fixed by 
the Reparation Commission and placed by it to the credit of the predeces-
sor State90. 
It would appear, however, that the cases cited above are exceptional 
instances, the rule being that the successor State acquires public property 
without compensation. Indeed, there are a tremendous number of cases 
where the succession took place ipso jure, without payment. A few exam-
ples of these cases follow. 
The Treaty of Lausanne of July 1923 presents the following rule in its 
Art. 60: 
note 45 Article 2. According to Paenson, Israel paid about 1,700,000 pounds for these 
assets (PAENSON, Les conséquences financières de la succession des Etats, Paris, 
Domat-Mont Chrestien, 1954, p. 64). 
89. British practice, in relation to the various colonies which acceeded to independence 
since 1960, is completely mysterious on this question. If we take a look at the various 
legal instruments in connection with these events, we shall find nothing; see, for 
example: Malawi Independence Act, 1964, C. 46; Malawi Independence Order, S.I. 
1964; Bahamas Independence Order, 1973, S.I. Part II; Fiji Independence Act, 1970, 
C. 50; The Fiji Independence Order, 1970, S.I. Part III; Mauritius Independence Act, 
1968, C. 8; The Mauritius Independence Order, 1968, C. 14; Guyana Republic Act, 
1970, C. 18; The Guyana Independence Order, S.I. 1966; Lesotho Independence Act, 
1966, C. 24; The Lesotho Independence Order, S.I. 1966-67; Barbados Independence 
Order, S.I. 1966, and so on. The only explanation we found is the one given by 
professor O'Connell when he says: "When a dependent British territory becomes 
independent and retains the monarchy there is no necessity to make provisions for the 
assignment to it of public property, because this remains crown property. Property of 
the United Kingdom government is unaffected by the change; property of the terri-
torial government is henceforth held by the crown in right of the newly independent 
country." O'CONNEL, op. cit., supra, note 63, Vol. 1, p. 210. It is Mr. Bedjaoui's 
opinion that in the absence of special reference to that question in British legal instru-
ments, it cannot be assumed that the successor State has any obligation in this respect. 
Yearbook. . ., 1970, Vol. II, p. 149, Doc. A/CN.4/226. 
90. Treaty ofNeullly, in: ISRAEL, supra, note 34, Vol. Ill, p. 1781; Treaty of Trianon, in: 
Idem, Vol. Ill, p. 1960. As a matter of fact, the scheme provided for in these articles 
did not work. 
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The States in favour of which territory was or is detached from the Ottoman 
Empire after the Balkan wars or by the present treaty shall acquire, without 
payment, all the property and possessions of the Ottoman Empire situated 
therein." 
Similar provisions were made by the Italian Peace Treaty, in 1947, in 
regard to Trieste92 and other States. The Resolution 388(v), adopted by 
the General-Assembly of the United-Nations in 1950, approved the fol-
lowing Article relating to Libya: 
Libya shall receive, without payment removable and immovable property lo-
cated in Libya owned by the Italian State.93 
If one now considers the French practice, it should be kept in mind that a 
French writer already characterized this practice in the following manner: 
Le caractère gratuit du tranfert est l'aspect le plus frappant de la succession des 
nouveaux Etats d'Afrique aux biens français. Dans la mesure où le transfert a 
donné lieu à des règlements domaniaux, il n'en est pas un qui ne le consacre.94 
This opinion, of course, relates chiefly to the French public domain. For 
example, Article 6 of the agreement between France and Mauritania con-
cerning public property states expressly that the transfer will not give rise 
to any indemnity95. The same solution governed the relations between 
France and Senegal96 and it is legitimate to consider that this general 
principle governed the relations between the United Kingdom and her 
former dependent territories. 
1.3.2. Theoretical aspects 
In the doctrine of international law, there is a widespread and unani-
mous tendency to consider that public property passes to the successor 
State without compensation97. However, I must deplore the fact that this 
91. Peace treaty between the allied powers and Turkey, in: ISRAEL, supra, note 34, 
Vol. IV, p. 2301 and p. 2329. The same is true in regard to the Treaty of Sevres, 
Article 240, in: Idem, Vol. Ill, p. 2139. 
92. Annex 10, par. 1: "The free territory of Trieste shall receive, without payment Italian 
State and para-statal property within the free territory", in: Idem, Vol. IV, p. 2502. 
93. Annex XIV, Par. 1: "The successor State shall receive without payment Italian State 
and para-statal property within territory ceded to it under the present treaty, as well as 
relevant archives and documents of an administrative character or historical value 
concerning the territory in question, or relating to property transferred under this 
paragraph", in: Idem, Vol. IV, p. 2515. 
94. FOUILLOUX, "La succession aux biens publics français dans les Etats nouveaux 
d'Afrique", [1965] A.F.D.I. 914. 
95. Supra, note 32. 
96. Supra, note 33. 
97. Supra, note 19. 
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same doctrine is so silent about the philosophical or legal foundations be-
hind the asserted rule. As far as I am aware, nobody has tried to investigate 
why it is that the successor State may inherit public property without, at 
the same time, being required to pay fair compensation. A possible ans-
wer to that question is, perhaps, that the doctrine takes for granted a rule 
which is in need of greater elucidation. 
When the matter was discussed by the International Law Commis-
sion98, there was unanimous agreement on the general principle to the 
effect that the passing of State property from the predecessor State to the 
successor State must take place without compensation. Such a conclusion 
was reached upon the basis of the evidence provided for in Mr. Bedjaoui's 
Third Report; however, it must be admitted that that Report is very 
deceptive and less than convincing on this particular point100. This failure 
was, indeed, diplomatically pointed out by Mr. Tammes100 and it would 
seem that the Commission was in effect working out a rule for the pro-
gressive development of international law101. In this respect, it is very 
interesting to cite Mr. Tammes' opinion where he is reported to have 
said: 
As to the absence of compensation, he was not quite sure that the new rule would 
be the just rule in all cases of succession. It might be so in typical cases of 
decolonization, but perhaps it might not be so in the more numerous cases of 
secession which might occur in the future.102 
It is easier to understand, therefore, the reasons why the International 
Law Commission chose to add the following words: "unless otherwise 
agreed or decided" to the original draft proposed by Mr. Bedjaoui103. 
This new formulation suggests that the "without payment rule" is not so 
98. See: 1240th meeting, Yearbook. . ., 1973, Vol. I, p. 198. 
99. Yearbook. . ., 1970, Vol. II, p. 149, Doc. A/CN.4/226. It is to be noted that 
Mr. Bedjaoui abstained generally from any purely theorectical study of problems 
which arise from State succession to public property. This is a serious lacuna which 
weakens the weight of his reports. 
100. 1232th meeting, June 22, 1973, Yearbook. . ., 1973, Vol. I, p. 153. 
101. Ibid., by Mr. Tammes. 
102. Ibid. See also Mr. Uskakov's opinion at: 1240th meeting, July 4, 1973, ibid., 195. 
103. See more especially the 1240th meeting, July 4, 1973, ibid.. Article 8, provisionally 
adopted, reads as follows: "Without prejudice to the rights for third parties, the 
passing of State property from the predecessor State to the successor State in accor-
dance with the provisions of the present articles shall take place without compensation 
unless otherwise agreed or decided"; Yearbook. . ., 1974, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 91. 
Mr Bedjaoui's original draft reads as follows: "Property necessary for the exercice of 
sovereignty over the territory affected by the Succession of States shall devolve, 
automatically and without compensation, to the Successor State", Yearbook. . ., 
1973, Vol. II, p. 10, Doc. A/CN.4/267 Art. 9. 
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imperative and automatic as doctrine asserts it to be. It would follow that 
Mr. Bedjaoui's substantive provision on the matter is not so much a 
statement of the international law in force lex lata as a practical directive 
de lege ferenda. 
The above considerations lead one to the heart of the problem: why 
is it that a successor State could succeed to the property of the predeces-
sor State without compensation? In reality, a right answer to this question 
may be derived only from a right answer to a more basic issue: how does 
State property pass from one State to another? In spite of the fact that this 
fundamental problem is of the utmost importance for the general theory of 
State succession, it does not appear to have received much attention by 
the majority of writers. Professor O'Connell appears to be the only one 
who presents the right questions about this issue but without any satisfy-
ing solution104; indeed, when O'Connell says that: 
( . . . ) as a matter of juristic logic it might be argued that the successor State is 
entitled to the public property which appertains to the territory, wherever it is 
located. . .106 
I do not think that he is resolving a great deal. If the notion of territorial 
jurisdiction must appear as the key concept in order to understand what is 
going on, there is nothing more to add to the matter of State succession: 
the new State, by virtue of its territorial sovereignty may do anything it 
wishes! I think that any attempt to give a proper answer to this problem is 
putting it within an adequate historical perspective. 
In cases of conquests, which were rather common in the earlier cen-
turies, it is legally comprehensive that the new conqueror did not have to 
pay for the public property of the new country which was brought into 
subjection. Above all, the conquest was the conquest of a territory and 
this same territory was essentially the beginning and the end of what is now 
called public property; at best, the conqueror could find some bar-
racks, forts, structures, and so on. Secondly, it should be borne in mind 
that, at that time, the legal conception of State territory was not distinct 
from that of State ownership; territory was both the subject-matter of a 
right of sovereignty (or imperium) and of a right of ownership (or domi-
nium). For example, it is a fair statement to say that under feudal law, 
the whole of England was both the territory and the property of the 
Crown106. In this particular context, it is also fair to say that the successor 
104. "State Succession in Relation to New State", (1970) 2R.C.A.D.I. 166-169. 
105. Ibid., p. 167. 
106. See: BRIERLY, supra, note 19, p. 162. 
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State inherited the territory by virtue of its own conquest, like succession 
in private law. 
As may be expected, legal theory developed as well as economic 
reality. If territory is generally considered now as a basic element neces-
sary to the existence of a State, a clear distinction is drawn, nevertheless, 
between the two concepts of imperium and dominium101. Territory ap-
pears rather as the "physical sphere within which the competence of the 
State is manifested"108 while State ownership, far from being limited to 
lands, is present everywhere in the life of the nation. Indeed, it is a truism 
to say that State property is directly connected to the social, economic 
and political life of the nation in most countries of the world. 
Of course, these considerations do not suggest that the successor 
State should have to pay a fair compensation for the territory over which 
it now extends its sovereignty; territorial jurisdiction has no market value 
and any effort to try to determine one would be useless. On the contrary, 
the foregoing does suggest that traditional doctrine, in order to make the 
rule of no compensation legitimate has extended the concept of territory 
to such a point that it can include everything, from lands to airplanes. 
There is something fictitious in establishing at all costs a link with the 
territory when, in fact, this link is often purely accidental. While one can 
easily agree that public buildings and works, arsenals, lighthouses, li-
braries, bridges roads, waterways, etc. . . are of the nature of territory, it is 
more difficult to see this same quality in the activity of a national and 
public corporation which, although it is located within the seceding terri-
tory, contributes to the economy of an entire country. My firm opinion, 
107. "As against other states, a State has in international law the right of property or 
domain in the territory and fixtures within its limits. This right of property is not the 
right in the old feudal sense, for in modern public law ownership may vest in the State 
only in a limited sense, except for territory to which none of its subjects have titles." 
(G. WILSON, International Law, 9th Ed., New-York, Silver-Burdett and Co., 1935, 
p. 79). Wheaton writes: "(. . .) the conception of a State as possessing property in its 
territory was naturally and inevitably borrowed by the early jurists from Roman Law. 
Doubtless the analogy is incomplete, and there is a real distinction between the ideas 
of property (dominium) and territorial supremacy (imperium). H. WHEATON, Elements 
of International Law, 6th Ed., by W.B. Lawrence, 1857, Vol. 1, p. 334. L.F.L. OP-
PENHEIM, International Law, 3d Ed., London, by R.F. ROXBURG, 1920, Vol. 1, 
p. 306: "The territory of a State is not the property of the monarch, or of the govern-
ment." 
108. O'CONNEL, op. cit. supra, note 19, Vol. 1, p. 404. See also L.F.L. OPPENHEIM, In-
ternational Law, supra, note 107, Vol. 1, p. 307: "The importance of State territory 
lies in the fact that it is the space within which the State exercices its supreme author-
ity." 
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therefore, does not give to the rule of no compensation the automatic 
character which it often receives. 
2. Succession to public debt 
If the Province of Quebec becomes an independent State, the ques-
tion arises whether or not the new State has an obligation to take over a 
proportional part of the debts of the State of which it once formed a part. 
On a theoretical level, there is no uniformity as to the right solution which 
one must arrive at on this issue. According to Hackworth, 
There appears to be no legal obligation on the part of a seceding province to 
assume some share of the national debt when the identity of the parent state is 
maintained.10' 
But the opposite view is often held. Sack's thesis, which is followed by 
many commentators, can be described as follows: 
Au cas de démembrement du territoire de l'Etat débiteur, le gouvernement de 
chaque partie du territoire démembré doit assumer une part de l'ancienne dette, 
proportionnelle à la force contributive de cette partie du territoire.110 
As a matter of fact, there have indeed, been, a considerable number of 
historical instances supporting both theories, and international practice is 
by no means uniform. To sum up, it would seem that both practice and 
doctrine reveal great divergencies on the question of whether the new 
State is obliged to assume a part of the public financial obligations of its 
predecessor. In reality, some of the difficulties in dealing with this topic 
arise chiefly from the very nature of the problem, which varies with the 
circumstances of each case and from the number of distinctions that may 
be employed in discussing it. In order to clarify the situation, it may be 
useful to consider the two important theories which have been presented 
concerning succession to public debts. First to be examined will be that 
theory which considers that the successor State assumes no part of the 
old State's debts (see Part 2.1.). Second, that theory which considers that 
the seceding territory should assume an equitable share of the general 
debt (see Part 2.2). The enquiry will be completed by a study of the 
question of repartition (see Part 2.3.). 
109. Digest of International Law, Washington, U.S. Govt Print. Off, 1940, Vol. 1, p. 540. 
110. A.N.SACK, La Succession aux dettes publiques d'Etat, Paris, Hachette, 1929, p. 161. 
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2.1. The negative theory 
2.1.1. Legal foundations 
According to a considerable weight of authority among international 
law writers1 ' ', the new State is not required to take over a certain portion 
of the national debt112. Generally, authors justify this theory on the major 
ground that the international personality of the predecessor State still 
exists, as well as its fiscal competence. One of the most learned au-
thorities on this subject expresses this point of view as follows: 
(. . .) Where only part of the debtor State is aborded, both its international 
personality and its fiscal competence remain undisturbed, although its paying 
capacity may be diminished. The debtor State is still the debtor and if the debt is 
unsecured the legal relationship between it and the creditor is intact."3 
However, such a view pays no attention to an important preliminary 
matter: is it true that the predecessor State retains its international per-
sonality? This question is surely not illogical if one takes into account two 
famous precedents on this issue. The first case relates to the separation of 
Belgium from the Netherlands, in 1830. Pradier—Fodere and Fauchille 
categorically assert that the dismemberment of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands resulted in the supression of the ancient State and conse-
n t . H.W. HALLECK, International Law, London, C.K. Paul & Co., 1878, Vol. 1, p. 76; 
HACKWORTH, supra, note 109; P. GUGGENHEIM, Traité de droit international public, 
Genève, 1953-54, p. 275; H.A. WILKINSON, The American Doctrine of State 
Succession, Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1934, p. 95; A.S. HERSHEY, The 
Succession of States, [\9\1]A.J.L.L. 285. T. BATY, "Division of States: Its Effects or 
Obligations", in: Transactions of the Grotius Society, 1923, Vol. 9, p. 122; OP-
PENHEIM, International Law a Treatise, 7th Ed., London by H. Lauterpacht, Long-
mans, Green and Co., 1948, Vol. 1, p. 160; E.H. FEILCHENFELD, Public Debts and 
State Succession, New York, The MacMillan Co., 1931, p. 667; KEITH,supra, note 5, 
p. 62; O'CONNELL, supra, note 7, Vol. 1, p. 395. 
112. By national debt, it must be understood that debt "(. . .) shown in the general re-
venues accounts of the central government"; see 54 International Law Association, 
Conference Report (1970) p. 108. The public debt of Canada consists of those 
liabilities which appear on the government's statement of assets and liabilities; in 
addition, the Federal Government has certain indirect obligations such as the guaran-
tee of securities of the Canadian National Railways, which in a Crown corporation. 
This public debt consists chiefly of treasury bills, treasury notes, bonds and deben-
tures. It is very important to keep in mind, here, that we deal with the so-called 
"unsecured debt", that is to say, a debt for which liquidation is not provided from 
predetermined assets or revenues (for this distinction, see D.P. O'CONNELL, Secured 
and Unsecured Debts in the Law of State Seccession, B.Y.I.L., 1951, Vol. XXXVIII, 
p. 210. 
113. O'CONNELL, supra, note 111, Vol. 1, p. 395. 
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quently that the legal personality of the old State ceased to exist114. 
Nevertheless, a contrary view was held by the Secretary General of the 
United Nations Organization in his declaration on the position of the 
Dominions of India and Pakistan vis-à-vis the United Nations Organiza-
tion; indeed, he made no differentiation between the Belgian case and the 
Indian case: India, though much reduced in territory, was considered the 
same international entity as before, the situation being analogous to the 
separation of Belgium from the Netherlands115 
These two cases show that territorial transformations of States can 
lead to diverse consequences in international law. Above all, they stress 
the importance of territory as a basic element in the existence of the State. 
Therefore, it is only by examining the circumstances of each particular 
case that one can find out whether a loss of territory is important enough 
to alter the legal personality of a State. If this test is applied to the Canadian 
Federation, a strong case can be made to the effect that the loss of the Prov-
ince of Quebec would not alter Canada's international status. Such an 
opinion relies principally on the history of the territorial formation of that 
country: when the Dominion was established in 1867, it was formed by the 
union of four provinces only, namely Ontario, Nova Scotia, New Brun-
swick and Quebec"6. Canada was Canada without Manitoba, Saskat-
chewan, Alberta, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island and New-
foundland, provinces which joined the union later1 n.A contrario, one may 
114. PRADIER-FODERE, op. cit.,supra, note 19, p. 251. 
115. This legal opinion reads as follows: "From the view of the international law, the 
situation is one of which part of an existing State break off and becomes a new State. 
On this analysis there is no change in the international status of India: it continues as a 
State with all rights and obligations of membership in the United Nations. The terri-
tory which break off—Pakistan—wlll be a new State. It will not have the treaty rights 
and obligations of the old State and will not of course have membership in the United 
Nations. In international law, the situation is analogous to the separation of the Irish 
Free State from Britain and of Belgium from the Netherlands. In these cases the 
portion which separated was considered a new State and the remaining portion con-
tinued as an existing State will all rights and duties which it had before." General 
Assembly, Official Records, 17th Session, Suppl. 9, par. 72, U.N., Doc. A/5209. See 
also the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order 1947, G.G.O. no. 17 
in: Government of Pakistan, Constitutional Documents, Vol. IV-B, Karachi, 1964, 
p. 944. 
116. See: British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict. C. 3 (U.K.). 
117. These provinces became respectively a part of the Dominion of Canada in 1870 (Man-
itoba Act, 1870, 33 Vict., C. 3); 1873 (Order of Her Majesty in Council admitting 
Prince Edward Island into the Union, in : R.C.S. 1970, App. II, p. 291) ; 1871 (Order of 
Her Majesty in Council admitting British Columbia into the Union, in: R.C.S. 1970, 
App. II, p. 279); 1905 (Alberta Act, 4-5 Ed. VII, C.3 and Saskatchewan Act, 4-5 Ed. 
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then conclude that the loss of one province, even though it is the largest 
province, would not change anything in the international status of the Can-
adian Federation. For these reasons, it is submitted that Quebec's seces-
sion would have no effect on the identity in the predecessor State. There 
are, indeed, numerous instances where loss of territory was not considered 
to destroy the identity of a State, even when such a loss was of a substantial 
character"8. 
2.1.2. Critical outlook 
This preliminary point clarified, there seems to be no reason for the 
general underpinning of this theory which denies any obligation on the part 
of the new State to pay a fair proportion of the central debt. Indeed, it is 
one thing to say that there can be no legal rule imposed on the successor 
State with respect to the creditors—as O'Connell writes119—and another 
thing to draw the conclusion that there can, therefore, be no obligation 
imposed on the successor State vis-à-vis the predecessor State! While it is 
right to conclude that the contractual relationship between the creditor 
and the debtor State is not destroyed by the loss of a portion of territory, 
that does not necessarily mean that international law has nothing to say 
about the relationship between these two States. Moreover, if legal 
reasoning forces one to admit that international personality and fiscal 
VII, C. 42) and 1949 (Act to confirm and give effect to terms of Union agreed between 
Canada and Newfoundland, 12-13 Geo. VI, C. 22 (U.K.)). 
118. Great Britain remains the same international person after the loss of an empire! The 
same can be said for Columbia, after Panama secession, from Belgium after Congo 
secession, and from France after the loss of Algeria and many other African territories. 
For a full discussion of this problem, see: C. MAREK, Identity and Continuity of States 
in Public International Law, Genève, E. Droz, 1968. 
119. O ' C O N N E L L , op. cit. supra, note 7, at p. 394-395. See also M.A. CAVAOLIERI, "Effets 
juridiques des changements de souveraineté territoriale", in: (1934) 15Revue de droit 
international et de législation comparée 243: "Quel est le sort des obligations patri-
moniales, des dettes de l'Etat démembré ? Il ne faut pas oublier qu'il continue 
d'exister et garde son individualité. Il doit donc rester tenu envers ses créanciers. Il a 
contracté personnellement la dette et la variation de ses ressources ne peut pas modi-
fier en principe la portée de ses obligations. Ses créanciers gardent leur action et leurs 
droits envers lui comme auparavant. Ils n'ont qu'un seul débiteur, l'Etat qui a émis 
l'emprunt ou contracté la dette. Leur droit de poursuite reste ce qu'il était avant le 
démembrement." FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra, note 111, p. 675: "If only a part of 
the territory of the public debtor has come under a new sovereignty the old sovereign 
remain able to interfere with the existence of the debt. The new sovereign, on the other 
hand, cannot destroy the jural relation existing in a foreign system of law. Conse-
quently, only the old sovereign can be responsible for destruction of the debt, and no 
such responsibility can lie with cessionnary." 
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competence of the old State remain undisturbed, nevertheless it is not 
illogical to think that its paying capacity in the matter of debt amortization 
can be highly impaired by secession120. Where, then, is the principle 
which might protect creditor' rights if secession really involves a terri-
torial loss sufficiently heavy to destroy the paying capacity of the pre-
decessor State? Obviously, there is something unsatisfactory in this 
theory, and it is interesting to note that even professor O'Connell's opin-
ion seems to be evolving on this particular issue. Indeed, this learned 
publicist wrote, in 1970, that it would be "inequitable to preserve the 
formal debt relationship"121 in all cases; now he is ready to admit that 
"(. . .) both the predecessor State and the national States of the creditors 
have rights under international law to call upon the successor State to 
undertake a fair proportion of the amortization"122 if the predecessor 
State becomes economically disabled in debt servicing. Clearly if cre-
ditor' interests are the starting point of the negative theory, these same 
interests must also be the finishing line. But it is precisely in this matter 
that the negative theory confronts its own dilenma. As it was described by 
O'Connell in 1970 "(. .) it aggravates rather than mitigates the legal 
crisis occasioned by change of sovereignty and is inherently anarchic".123 
2.1.3. An important exception to the negative theory: the benefit theory 
Furthermore, it is not without significance that the negative theory 
lays down its own exceptions. It is generally recognized that the succes-
sor State, while it is not required to take over a part of the general debt, 
is, nevertheless, expected to assume payment of debts raised for the 
benefit of the seceding territory. In this respect Hackworth says: 
In the case of a debt raised for the purposes of the ceded territory or charged 
upon its local revenues, it is held by the majority of writers, who cite numerous 
treaties in support, that the obligation passes with the land to its new owners.1 '" 
120. However, this is not necessarily true in practice. One may imagine the case when a 
"poor territory" secedes, thereby decreasing the burdens of the population of the 
predecessor State. On the general effects of territorial changes upon the financial 
interests of State and their creditors, see FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra, note 111, 
p. 5. 
121. D.P. O ' C O N N E L L , International Law, 2d Ed., Londres, Stevens and Sons, 1970, 
Vol. 1, p . 384. 
122. Ibid. 
123. Ibid., p . 367. 
124. HACKWORTH, supra, note 109, p . 540. Seel also P. FIORE, Droit internaiionll public, 
Paris, Pedone-Lauriel, 1885, T. 1, p. 813; W.E. H A L L , A Treatise of International 
Law, Oxford, A.P. Higgins, The Clarendon Press, 1917, p . 94; GUGGENHEIM, op. cit. 
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It can be seen that debts raised by the central government for the purpose 
of expenditures on particular projects in the particular seceding terri-
tory125 are assimilated to local debts and must, therefore, be paid by the 
new State. The rationale of this doctrinal construction is very clear: it 
would be unjust to permit the successor State to enjoy the benefits accruing 
to its territory as the result of financial commitments assumed by the prede-
cessor State, without at the same time bearing the burden of the debt. Res 
transit cum suo onere. Basically, this general exception to the negative 
theory is a sound one but it gives rise to serious difficulties. 
2.1.4. Critical outlook 
In the first place, one can ask which party will assume the burden of 
proof. When the visible benefits of the debt are directly connected with 
the seceding territory, for instance, if the proceeds of the loan have been 
devolved to the erection of permanent improvements on the territory, 
common sense and good faith may afford adequate answers. On the con-
trary, more cryptic situations can give rise to endless discussions. For 
example, how would it be possible to measure the value of these benefits 
when improvements indirectly favor the predecessor State? It would al-
ways be possible for the predecessor State to argue that all debts have 
benefited the seceding territory, directly or indirectly, while it might al-
ways be argued, on the contrary, that the central debt (although connected 
with the territory) was not used in fact for the benefit of the territory, i.e. 
for its economic, social or cultural development. On the one hand, the 
predecessor State might be tempted to extend the concept of benefit 
while, on the other hand, the successor might be tempted to operate a 
distinction between productive and unproductive debts. For all these 
reasons, I do not think that Hyde correctly answers these questions when 
he formulates his own test on the matter, saying: 
While there may be question as to which party should assume the burden of 
proof, it is believed that in the formulation of a rule of law designed to promote 
justice and, therefore, to command general approval, it should be laid down first, 
that the duty of the new sovereign to bear a portion of the debt of the old should 
be dependent upon the benefits accruing to the territory transferred; and sec-
ondly, that such benefits should not necessarily be deemed to be non-existent 
when the debt is general rather than local.126 
supra, note 111, p. 472; OPPENHEIM,op. cit. supra, note 111, Vol. 1, p. 159; CAVARÉ, 
op. cit. supra, note 20 p. 382; M. SIBERT, Traité de droit international public, Paris, 
Dalloz, 1951, T. 1, p. 210. 
125. This kind of debts is called "localised debt" or "dette hypothéquée sur le sol". 
126. HYDE International Law. Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, 2d 
Ed., Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1947, Vol. 1, p. 403. 
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With due respect, one must say that Hyde's statement completely begs 
the question. But it must be admitted that no publicist ever tried to re-
solve the problem. Obviously, the fact that a central debt was more or less 
connected with the territory does not provide a sufficient basis for con-
sidering it as local and therefore transmissible to the successor State. 
Hyde, himself confessed that the distinction between the general and 
localised debts has not always been useful in practice127 
In addition, the benefit theory comes up against a second serious 
difficulty. Borrowing is essentially an alternative means of raising re-
venues to cover expenditures, next to taxation which can be considered 
as the normal way in which a government secures the revenues that it 
needs to finance public services. When the rate of spending exceeds the 
rate of tax collections the national government deficit is ordinarily fi-
nanced by what is called "debt issue". Therefore, it would be a delicate 
task if one should be required to operate a real distinction between 
amounts which came from tax revenues and amounts which came from 
the sale of debt instruments. In fact, the amounts which are assigned to 
the seceding territory come from the Consolidated Revenue Fund128 and 
it is impossible to draw a clear distinction based on the origin of these 
funds. Unless notice is officially given that a particular debt issue will be 
raised in order to cover some extraordinary expenditures connected with 
the territory such as long term highway construction, irrigation projects, 
river valley developments or urban renewal programs the advantages or 
benefits of the expenditures cannot be linked with certainty to any special 
issue. 
Finally, supporters of the negative theory, while denying any legal 
obligation on the part of the new State to assume some proportion of the 
central debt, often recognize at the same time some moral obligation to 
that effect. For example, Hershey writes: 
Many of the authorities maintain that the partial successor must also take over a 
proportional part of the general public debt of the ceding or dismembered State; 
127. Certains Effects of Change ofSovereignty, Washington, Government Print Off, 1919, 
at p. 17: "The distinction frequently laid down between the general and local debt of a 
contracting State has not always served a useful purpose for it has tended in the case of 
the former, to encourage an assumption unduly favorable to the new sovereign and in 
that of the latter to suggest the imposition of an injust or excessive burden. In neither 
case it refected closely the practice of States". 
128. Article 102 of theBritish North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Victt C.3 (U.K.) provides for 
the creation of this Fund; this Fund is appropriated by the Parliament of Canada for the 
public service of Canada. As a matter of fact, the net proceeds from the sale of notes 
and bonds are ordinarily added to the Counsolidated Fund and are applied to general 
expenses of the Dominion. 
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but, however equitable and just such an arrangement may be, it cannot be main-
tained that this is a positive rule of the law of nations.129 
Prima facie, such an admission is rather surprising. But it is precisely at 
this point that the ambiguities of the negative theory become really appar-
ent and that the fundamental differences of opinion that exist concerning 
the nature of law itself appear so clearly. Indeed, it can be asked whether 
considerations of justice are relevant here. It will be seen that these 
considerations have received large application in State practice and that it 
is not necessary to overemphasize the differences between the true con-
tent of the rules and the formalities of the law-making process. It is my 
submission that the negative theory simply forgot to collect evidence of a 
nascent contrary practice. 
2.1.5. The practice of States 
Despite the fact of its manifest weakness, one must admit that the 
negative theory was largely sanctioned in practice. A classical illustration 
of this theory is the fact that the United States of America did not take 
over any debt of Great Britain in 1783130. According to Feilchenfeld, this 
is not an isolated case for during the entire period from 1648 to about 1815 
it does not appear that general debts were ever taken over by the succes-
sor State in cases of cession or secession131. In 1925, in an arbitral deci-
sion made in relation to the Ottoman Public Debt, Mr. Borel said; 
On ne peut considérer comme acquis en droit international positif le principe 
qu'un Etat acquérant partie du territoire d'un autre doit en même temps se 
charger d'une fraction correspondante de la dette publique de ce dernier. Pareille 
obligation ne peut découler que du traité ou l'assume l'Etat en cause et elle 
n'existe que dans les conditions et les limites où elle s'y trouve stipulée.132 
In that case, it will be recalled that Turkey's claim was that the Treaty of 
Lausanne™3, in providing for the distribution of the Ottoman public debt 
129. A.S. HERSCHEY, The Essentials of International Public Law, New York, The Mac 
Millan Co., 1912, p. 135; see also OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra, note 111, p. 160: "It 
would be only just if the successor had to take over a corresponding part of the debt of 
its predecessor, but no rule of international law concerning this point can be said to 
exist (. . .)". 
130. Supra, note 22. 
131. FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra, note 111, p. 71. 
132. Affaire de la dette publique ottomane, Sentence of April 18, 1925, United Nations 
Report of Arbitral Awards, Vol. l ,p. 571. Mr. Borel said also, at p. 573: "De l'avis de 
l'arbitre, il n'est pas possible, malgré les précédents déjà existants, de dire que la 
puissance cessionnaire d'un territoire est, de plein droit, tenue d'une part correspon-
dante de la dette de l'Etat dont il faisait partie jusqu'alors." 
133. Israel, Vol. IV, p. 2301. 
322 Les Cahiers de Droit (1978) 19 C. de D. 285 
between Turkey and the States in favour of which territory had been 
detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, 
applied a rule of customary international law. This contention was re-
jected by Mr. Borel. As a matter of fact, the negative theory has success-
fully passed the test of time until the present, even though it has often 
been disputed by a contrary practice134. As a general rule, one can say 
that the negative theory has been revitalized since 1960, in the aftermath 
of decolonization; indeed, no instance has been found in which a new 
State succeeded to part of the general and unsecured debt of the pre-
decessor State135. However, it should be kept in mind that most decoloni-
zation cases were carried out with full political consent and financial aid 
from the parent State. In these circumstances, it would have been strange 
behavior for the metropolis to require apportionment of its own central 
debt; new States were already well enough burdened with their own local 
debts. Indeed most of the new States assumed liability for their own 
internal debts136 according to the usual practice in this matter. 
As has been seen in this part, the old rule states that liability for debt 
arising upon personal obligation of the predecessor State does not pass 
with the seceding territory unless stipulated in a particular agreement. As 
a man cannot be bound by a stranger's promise, so the new State has 
nothing to do with debts of a foreign country. Without any doubt, such a 
rule is completely in harmony with the doctrine of sovereignty and the 
positivist view of international law: a State has absolute freedom of action 
except in so far as it has agreed to rules restricting that freedom. How-
ever, it shall be recalled that the liability of a successor State to assume a 
proportional part of the general debt of the predecessor State was often 
sanctioned in the practice of States and it may be asked whether the 
principle of repartition is now part of international law. 
134. See infra, part 2.2. 
135. "According to the International Law Association, the Indonesian case is the only 
instance where a dependant territory agreed to a repartition of the National Debt." 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, Report of the fifty fourth Conference held at 
the Hague, August 23 to August 29, 1970, (London, 1971). 
136. "Indonesian assumed liability for all internal debts of Indonesia at the date of transfer 
of sovereignty", Round Table Conference Agreement between the Netherlands and 
Indonesia, U.N.T.S., Vol. 69, p. 200. Generally, see the Official Declaration of 
French Minister for Finances, in: J.O.R.F,, March 10, 1962: "Les Etats africains 
d'expression française et la République malgache s'acquittant régulièrement des 
échéances des emprunts contractés par les territoires d'outre-mer auxquels ils ont 
succédé." 
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2.2. Considerations concerning the rule of repartition 
In 1970, professor O'Connell wrote that "(. . .) there has never been 
any question about the justice of a repartition"137. He also said: 
(. . .) there is, as a matter of fact, a long history of debt repartition, almost every 
treaty relating to the transfer of territory in the past two centuries having en-
deavoured to mitigate the economic consequences of the transfer by assigning 
portion of the debt to the successor State.138 
It is the purpose of this section to demonstrate that that statement is right 
and that the theory on which it relies is basically in harmony with the 
present State of international economic cooperation. As a matter of fact, 
there is considerable treaty evidence in favour of apportionment and most 
jurists generally support that practice. 
2.2.1. The practice of states 
As a matter of history, it appears that one of the first instances where 
the rule of apportionment was applied is in the Belgian case, a case of 
partial succession139. By virtue of article 13 of the Treaty of London, the 
part of the central debt to be assumed by Belgium was fixed at five million 
Dutch florins140. It must be pointed out that the separation of Belgium 
took away from Holland more than fifty per cent of her domestic revenues 
and that this financial settlement was based, first of all, on considerations 
137. O'CONNELL, op. cit. supra, note 121, p. 384. 
138. Ibid. 
139. Contrary to an opinion agreed by many writers, that case was not the setting upon 
of two new States but the loss of her Belgian provinces by Holland. See: BATY, 
"Division of States: Its Effects on Obligations", in: Transactions of the Grotius Soci-
ety, 1923, Vol.9, p. 123; FEILCHENFELD,op. cit. supra, note 111, p. 207: "As the Holy 
Alliance was opposed to recognition of either conquest or revolution, it was a conve-
nient political expedient, once Belgian independence had become inevitable, to treat the 
separation as the dissolution of a temporary union ( . . . ) once the principle was recogniz-
ed that the separation was to be treated as the dissolution on a union, it was not un-
natural to provide for settlements which normally take place in case of dismember-
ment; namely fora general liquidation, a distribution of both the assets and liabilities of 
the old State". 
140. Traité fait et signé à Londres, le 19 avril 1839, entre la Belgique et la Hollande, 
relatif à la séparation de leurs territoires respectifs, in : MARTENS, Nouveau recueil de 
traités, 1830-1839, T. XVI, p. 773. Art. 13, reads as follows: "A partir du 1er janvier 
1839, la Belgique, du chef du partage des dettes publiques du Royaume des Pays-Bas, 
restera chargée d'une somme de cinq millions de florins des Pays-Bas, de rente an-
nuelle dont les capitaux seront transférés au débit du grand-livre d'Amsterdam et au 
débit du trésor général du Royaume des Pays-Bas, sur le débit du grand-livre de la 
Belgique". 
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of justice and equity141. It is true that the initial use of this practice was 
given by the Peace Treaty of Kiel of 1814, where Sweden assumed a part 
of the Danish debt upon the cession of Norway by Denmark in 1814142, 
and was followed in many other instances during the nineteenth century. 
In 1859, for example, by the Treaty of Zurich, Sardinia took over a large 
part of the debt of the Lombardo-Venitian Kingdom143. Similarly, Italy 
assumed, in 1866, payments on a part of papal debts after her annexation 
of provinces which had formed part of the papal State144. Also, in 1866, 
the Peace Treaty of Vienna, signed by Austria and Russia on the one side, 
and Denmark on the other, provided for the apportionment of the Danish 
debt after the loss of Schleswig and Holstein duchies by Denmark145. The 
Treaty of Berlin of 1878 also stipulated that Bulgaria Montenegro and 
Serbia should take over part of the Turkish debt146. 
At the beginning of this century, when Panama proclaimed its inde-
pendence after its secession from Columbia, the new Republic offered to 
pay a part of Columbia's exterior debt as soon as its independence was 
recognized by the Republic of Columbia. However, it would seem that 
141. FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra, note 111, p. 196. 
142. According to Feilchenfeld, the importance of this treaty lies in the fact that 
"(• • •) it is the first great international treaty of cession which provided for a general 
distribution of debts, and not merely for the transfer of dettes hypothéquées and other 
locally connected debts", op. cit. supra, note 111, p. 142. See Treaty of Peace and 
Alliance between Denmark and Sweden, signed at Kiel, January 14, 1814, in: PARRY, 
Vol. 63, p. 46: "Le montant entier des dettes de la monarchie danoise, étant affecté au 
Royaume de Norvège, qu'aux autres parties de l'Etat, Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède, en 
sa qualité du Royaume de Norvège, s'impose l'obligation d'en prendre à sa charge une 
partie, proportionnée à la population et aux ressources de la Norvège, relativement à 
la population et aux ressources du Danemark", (art. VI). 
143. Treaty of Peace Between Austria and France, signed at Zurich, November 10, 1859, 
Art. VII, in: PARRY, vol. 121, p. 146: "Le nouveau gouvernement de la Lombardie 
prendra à sa charge les trois cinquième de la dette du Monte-Lombardo-Venete. Il 
supportera également une portion de l'emprunt national de 1854 fixé entre les Hautes 
Parties contractantes à 40,000,000 de florins." See also the Treaty of Peace between 
Austria-Hungary and Italy, signed at Vienna, October 3, 1866, Art. VI, in: PARRY, 
Vol. 133, p. 209. "Le gouvernement italien prendra à sa charge les dettes ajoutées au 
Monte-Lombardo-Veneto depuis le 4 juin 1859 (. . .)." 
144. Convention between France and Italy for the Regulation of the Pontifical Debt, signed 
at Compiegne, December 7, 1866, in: PARRY, vol. 133, p. 317. 
145. MARTENS, Nouveau recueil général des traités, vol. 17, p. 470. 
146. Treaty between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and 
Turkey for the settlement of the affairs of the East, Art. IX, in: Vol. II, p. 975: "The 
amount of the annual tribute which the Principality of Bulgaria shall pay to the 
Suzerain Court (. . .) shall be fixed by an agreement between the Powers Signatory of 
the present treaty (. . .) this tribute shall be calculated on the mean revenue of the 
territory of the principality." See also Art. 33 and 42. 
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Panama was motivated by its desire of showing good faith toward Colum-
bia rather than by the sentiment that by right she owed any part of the 
Columbian debt147. In virtue of the Irish Peace Treaty of Dec. 1921148, 
the Irish Free State assumed liability for the service of the public debt of 
the United Kingdom in such proportion as "(• • •) may be fair and equita-
ble, having regard to any just claims on the part of Ireland by way of set 
off or counterclaim"149. 
Precursor of the peace treaties which put an end to World War I, the 
Treaty of Lausanne of 1912 also provided for an apportionment of general 
debts. As Tripoli and Cyrenaica were ceded to Italy at the end of the War 
between Italy and Turkey, Article 10 provided the obligation for Italy to 
pay to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration a sum equivalent to the 
average amount of the Tripoli revenues affected to the service of the 
Ottoman debt during the past three years,so. Indeed, this practice that 
part of the public debt of a dismembered State would be distributed 
among the detached territories was largely applied by the great peace 
treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly and Lausanne. The 
Treaty of Versailles expressly stipulated that the powers to which German 
territory was ceded should undertake to pay a portion of the debt of the 
German Empire as it stood on August 1, 1914, calculated on the basis of 
the ratio between the average for the three financial years 1911, 1912, and 
1913, of the revenues of the ceded territory and the average for the same 
years of the revenues of the whole Empire151. Like the Treaty of Versail-
les, the other peace treaties made similar provisions for the partial 
assumption of the debts of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. For 
example, the Treaty of St. Germain provided that each of the States to 
which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was transfer-
147. Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, Government Print Office, 1904, 
at p. 282. It shall be noted that the United States through its treaty with Columbia of 
April 1914 agreed to pay to the latter the sum of $ 25,000,000 dollars, League of 
Nations Treaties Series, Vol. IX, p. 301. 
148. Treaty between Great Britain and the Irish Free State, in ISRAEL, op. cit. supra, 
note 34, Vol. Ill, p. 2269. 
149. Ibid., Art. 5: "The amount of such sums being determined in default of agreement by 
the arbitration of one or more independent persons being citizens of the British Em-
pire". 
150. Treaty of Lausanne, October 18, 1912. Art. 10, in: ISRAEL, op. cit. supra, note 34, 
Vol. II, p. 1005. 
151. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919. Art. 254 in: ISRAEL, op. cit. supra, note 34, 
Vol. II. 
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red should assume responsibility for a portion of the unsecured bonded 
debt of the former Austrian Government152. 
One may thus conclude that the treaties of 1919 were in accord with 
the general practice of the nineteenth century in regard to the division of 
debts. But the extent to which this practice had become a principle of 
international law in 1920 is surely a matter for dispute1S3. If such a rule did 
not exist at that time, one may ask why certain treaties provided ex-
pressly that an apportionment would not be required154. A more recent 
illustration of this tendency is seen in the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 
which specifies that Trieste "(• • •) shall be except from the payment of 
the Italian public debt"155. This provision suggests that the Allied Powers 
established an exception to a general rule otherwise valid, in favour of 
Trieste. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Free Territory of 
Trieste assumed the obligations of the Italian State towards holders who 
continued to reside in its territory. 
Since World War II, the practice of apportionment can be retraced at 
least in two important instances. In the Indian case, India assumed entire 
responsability for all the liabilities of the old Government of undivided 
India, subject, however, to an equitable contribution by the Pakistan 
Government. Pakistan's share was made up of the value of physical and 
financial assets lying in Pakistan, or taken over by Pakistan. Pakistan's 
share of the central debt was fixed at 17 and half per cent157. The same 
principle was applied in the Indonesian case. The debt agreement reached 
between the Netherlands and Indonesia provided that Indonesia should 
assume responsability for a number of consolidated loans and debts to 
third countries158. More particularly, the new sovereign State assumed its 
share of the Netherlands National Consolidated Debt of 1896. As noted 
152. Treaty of St. Germain, September 10, 1919. Art. 203, in: ISRAEL, op. cit. supra, 
note 34, Vol. III. See also Treaty ofNeuilly, Art. 141: "Any power to which Bulgarian 
territory is ceded in accordance with the present treaty undertakes to pay a contribu-
tion towards the charge for the Bulgarian Public Debt as it stood on October 11, 
1915. . .", Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, Art. 186; Treaty of Sevres, August 10, 
1920, Art. 241. 
153. Supra, note 132. 
154. Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921, in: ISRAEL, op. cit. supra, note 34, Vol. Ill, p. 2215. 
155. ISRAEL, op. cit. supra, note 34, Vol. IV, p. 2503. 
156. Ibid. 
157. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. VI, Part. 2, at p. 9066. The total amount 
owing by Pakistan to India was to be paid in 60 annual equal instalments. 
158. Round Table Conference Agreement between the Government of Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, Draft Financial and 
Economic Agreement, Art. 25, U.N.T.S. Vol. 69, p. 200. 
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earlier, the Indonesian case is the only instance where a dependent colony 
agreed to assume a part of the central debt159. 
2.2.2. Legal foundations of the rule 
It would appear from the foregoing cases that the old doctrine which 
says that there is no legal obligation on the part of the successor State to 
assume public and general financial obligations of its predecessor is not so 
absolute as it is generally propounded. Even though the rule of appor-
tionment "(. . .) cannot be said with any certainty to be as yet part of 
international law"160, the practice shows, that instances in which it was 
applied are too important to be overlooked or dismissed without further 
investigation. In reality, this practice shows that no unqualified affirma-
tion concerning the assumption of general public debts can be made, and 
it does suggest that the difficult choice which ought to be made between 
two conflicting systems should be based on the relative and specific val-
ues of their respective underlying theory. In this respect, it is interesting 
to discuss briefly the various reasons which were presented in the past in 
order to justify the principle of distribution of the general debt. Three of 
these shall be analysed here. 
2.2.2.1. The benefit theory 
First of all, it is possible to argue that the secessionist State must bear 
a share of the national debt on the following grounds: debts incurred by the 
predecessor State for general purposes benefited all the provinces directly 
or indirectly and in globo16x. For example, when the federal government 
makes unconditional payments to provinces under the Federal-Provincial 
Fiscal Arrangement Act162 it may be argued that part of these grants 
comes from the proceeds of various debt issues. More generally, it may 
be maintained that part of the current national debt was built up in order 
to cover expenditures relating to the seceding territory. Prima facie, this 
theory is appealing but its premise is not so obvious because it takes for 
granted an area that needs more evidence. Theoretically, it is possible 
that the secessionist State was at a disadvantage within the framework of 
its former association; under such circumstances, the benefit theory does 
159. Supra, note 135. 
160. O ' C O N N E L L , op. cit. supra, note 7, p. 396. 
161. H.J.F.X. BONFILS, Manuel de droit internaiionll public, 7th Ed., Paris, Rousseau, 
1914, p . 144. 
162. R.C.S. 1970, C. F-6. 
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not make sense163. Moreover, the same remarks which were made regard-
ing the so-called locally connected debts can be applied here; the fact that 
such and such a loan benefited the territory is very vague and proves 
nothing. Finally, adoption of this theory would logically mean that 
distribution of the debt should be proportional to the amount of benefits 
procured effectively for the territory of the new State; in these circums-
tances, too, the benefit theory is not very useful because it makes room 
for endless disputes between the two parties. 
2.2.2.2. Heffter and Appleton's theory 
A more unusual view concerning the legal basis of the obligation 
made on the successor State to assume a proportional part of the national 
debt was presented by Heffter and developed by Apleton164. For these 
publicists, the dismembered State suffers a partial extinction of its per-
sonality when it loses a part of its territory; as a part of its international 
personality is transferred to the new State, so the new State is required to 
take over a part of debts proportional to the part of international personal-
ity lost by the predecessor State. Apart from the fact that this theory 
never gained much acceptance among other publicists, the doctrine of 
Heffter and Appleton cannot be accepted. The mistake of these writers is 
that they confuse State territory with international personality. As was 
stated earlier, territorial changes do not affect a State's identity so long as 
these transformations are not total or very considerable. 
In the face of evidence, the theories examined so far suggest that any 
attempt to base the rule of apportionment on sound legal principles is 
bound to fail. The inescapable conclusion would seem to be that the 
successor State can do as it pleases with the general debt. However, such 
a conclusion would be premature. First of all, there is a legal basis for the 
rule of apportionment and secondly, one cannot forget that the justice of a 
repartition has been asserted by most publicists. 
2.2.2.3. Sack's theory 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that Sack's theory, which was worked 
out after World War I, did not receive all the attention which it deserves. 
163. An interesting study prepared by the Financial Department of the Government of 
Quebec suggests that this situation is closer to reality than one could imagine. Minis-
tère des Finances, La part du Québec dans les dépenses et les revenus du gouverne-
ment fédéral en 1971-19722 Unpublished Document, Quebec, ,973. 
164. H. APPLETON, Des effets des annexions de territoire sur les dettes de l'Etat démembré 
ou annexé et sur celles des provinces, départements annexés, Paris, éditeur, 1895. 
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In his masterly book published in 1927165, Sack tries to found on legal 
grounds the obligation of the successor State for taking over some part of 
the central debt. According to this learned publicist, all parts of the terri-
tory are permanently burdened with the contributions to the public debt: 
La base juridique du crédit public réside précisément dans ce fait que les dettes 
publiques grèvent le territoire de l'Etat débiteur.166 
If confusion is to be avoided here, one must say that Sack does not 
suggest that public debts burden the territory like a loan on mortgage; nor 
does he suggest that creditors would have the right to ask full payment on 
some part of State territory in the event of default. On the contrary, 
Sack's argument is chiefly based on the idea that the financial resources 
of the whole country constitute the sole guarantee possessed by the 
State's creditors. It is my submission that this theory is entirely supported 
by facts. Before investing, investors will look, first of all, at the strength 
of an economy through various factors such as the Gross National Pro-
duct, population, labor force, gross investment, compound annual rate of 
economic growth, political stability, and so on. Potential investors will 
reach a final decision once they are sure that there is no great risk for their 
investment. In the same manner, the State which wishes to borrow will 
look at its present and future resources in order to keep a fair relationship 
between its Gross National Product and the total amount of its consoli-
dated debt. From a general viewpoint, this relationship is important be-
cause too heavy a debt restricts the State's freedom of action over the 
determination of its domestic policies as well as over the determination of 
its financial and commercial relations with other countries167. In fact an 
elementary analysis of the borrowing process shows that public credit is 
firstly a question of confidence towards a particular economy, and that 
this confidence is based on the fact that all public resources of the land are 
allocated for the payment of the national debt. From this viewpoint, 
Sack's theory makes sense; indeed, to the extent that it is admitted that all 
financial resources of the State are allocated for servicing the national 
debt, it is not difficult to admit also that a State loses a portion of its 
resources when it loses a part of its territory. Although it is correct to say 
that the loss of territory does not necessarily cause injury to the interests 
of creditors this conclusion does not mean that the predecessor State 
165. SACK, Les effets des transformations des Etats sur leurs dettes publiques et autres 
obligations financières, Paris, Hachette 1927. 
166. Ibid. p . 54. 
167. Generally, see BUCHANAN, The Public Finances : an Introductory Textbook, 34d Ed., 
Georgetown, Ontario, Irwin-Dorsey, 1970. 
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cannot be injured by the same event. Therefore, to the extent that the old 
State suffers a diminution of its paying capacity, it seems fair enough to 
rule that the successor State is bound to assume the difference. 
Sack's theory was critized vigorously by Feilchenfeld on the major 
ground that it did not give definitive rights to creditors and was not an 
expression of positive law168. From Feilchenfeld, this criticism is not sur-
prising. First, Feilchenfeld maintains that if only a part of the territory is 
lost, this fact does not affect the legal identity of the predecessor State 
which remains responsible towards creditors. Second, Feilchenfeld bases 
his entire analysis from the starting point of creditor's interests; surely 
this approach is a sound one, but its major failure lies in the fact that it 
does not take into account economic relations between the predecessor 
State and the successor State. According to Feilchenfeld, so long as the 
debt relationship is unaffected by the change, there is no problem from 
the point of view of the person who has lent money to the predecessor 
State, because the contractual rights between it and the creditor still 
subsist. It is my submission that Sack's theory is not incompatible with 
Feilchenfeld's views; on the contrary, it is complementary: while the 
former analyses the relationship between creditors and the debtor State, 
the latter discusses the relationship between the debtor State and the new 
State. 
2.2.3. The role of equity 
While it is impossible to make a positive general statement on the 
basis of the material cited in the preceding section, it still might be argued, 
at least, that the predecessor State could demand the allocation of its 
general debt on the sole basis of equity. As it was correctly pointed out by 
O'Connell, "(. . .) the justice of a repartition has been universally 
admitted"169 and a strong case can be made, indeed, in order to put the 
predecessor State in as good a position as it would have occupied had the 
successor State performed its implicit promise to stay within the old 
168. Op. cit. supra, note 111 p. 737: "The assertion that burdens of an absolute and perma-
nent character are permanent and therefore outlast territorial changes is merely a 
truism. Such an assertion is inconclusive without the proof that certain burdens actu-
ally possess an absolute and permanent character which protect them for all time 
against all third persons. It would have to be shown that burdens exist which gave 
definitive rights to creditor, that such rights are recognized in positive law and either 
that they have a permanent legal character which outlast territorial changes, or that 
interference with their permanence by the cessionary would constitute a violation of 
positive rules of law." 
169. O'CONNELL, op. cit. supra, note 7 p. 395. 
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State. Basically, there is a close analogy to be drawn between a case of 
secession and cases which give rise to application of the injurious-reliance 
theory in common law170. Although it is not generally advisable to use 
municipal law for the determination of international issues, it does not 
necessarily follow that general principles of law "(. . .) recognized by 
civilized nations" cannot be used as a source of international law. In 
1867, the Province of Quebec expressed its desire to be federally united 
into one Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom. Relying on 
that political fact, the new Dominion created a national debt, year after 
year, when federal expenditures were in excess of federal revenues 
collections. It is also clear, from the viewpoint of sound management of 
public debt, that the new Dominion took into account that all its resources 
could be assigned for the payment of its debt. Should the Province of 
Quebec now want to put an end to its political association, in all fairness, 
it should protect the expectation interests of the predecessor State by 
assuming a proportional part of the national debt. There is, indeed, 
"(. . .) a general moral feeling that not only promises ought to be kept but 
that anyone innocently inspired by relying on them is entitled to have his 
loss "made good" by the one who thus caused it"171. It is my belief that 
ideas of justice are as relevant in the sphere of international relations as 
they are in the sphere of private relations among individuals. Refusal to 
take over a part of the general debt would suggest that there might be an 
unjust impoverishment with an unjust gain and this idea appears strong 
enough to support claims based on that consideration. 
2.3. The basis of repartition 
The weight of authority clearly supports the general doctrine, 
founded upon obvious principles of justice, that in the case of a partial 
succession the successor State should assume a part of the debts of the 
predecessor State; yet, there is an important question to be settled: how 
should one apply this principle? On a theoretical level, traditional doc-
trine suggests that apportionment can be fixed in accordance with three 
different indexes, namely: the extent of territory, the number of popula-
170. The essence of that theory can be put in this way: contractual liability arises where 
someone makes a promise explicitly in words or implicity by some acts, and someone 
else relies on it and suffers some loss thereby. Generally, see JACKSON, Contract Law 
in Modern Society, Cases and Materials, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1973; DOWSON and 
HARVEY, Contracts and Contracts Remedies, Brooklyn, 1959. 
171. SHEPHERD, Cases and Materials on Contract, Chicago, 1939. 
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tion and the economic resources of the land172. In practice, these three 
factors have been applied occasionally but their application is not without 
serious difficulties. 
2.3.1. Territory 
First of all, it might be argued that the amount which ought to be 
assumed by the seceding territory should be in direct correlation with the 
extent of territory which was lost from the old State. However, such a 
claim cannot stand up under serious analysis. The size of a territory does 
not prove anything because it is a bad index of the wealth of its popula-
tion; indeed, the seceding territory can be a large desert with a small 
population or a rich and over populated small area. For example, Quebec, 
the largest province in Canada, covers an area of approximately 600,000 
square miles, or 16% of the whole country173. The population of the 
Province 6,208,000 or about 27% of the total population of Canada. 
Moreover, in 1975, the Province accounted for 24.4% of the Gross Na-
tional Product of Canada. If the territory-basis must be chosen, such a 
policy might be considered as unfair by the remaining part of the old 
country because it could be viewed as too arbitrary and not representative 
of the financial capacity of its inhabitants. 
2.3.2. Population 
Population might be considered a better factor. After all, population 
is the chief source of the State's revenues. But this factor also has some 
disadvantages, for population can be poor here and rich there, crowded or 
sparse. An example will show some consequences which could be 
brought about by application ofthat index. State A, with a population of 
100,000,000 inhabitants, loses territory B with a population of 
25,000,000. If the population—factor is applied, the new State B will as-
sume 25% of the general debt—but this solution is not necessarily just in 
all cases. In a first hypothesis, it might happen that territory B accounted 
for more than 25% of the Gross National Product of State A and then 
State B's contribution might be seen as too low. In a second hypothesis, it 
might happen that territory B accounted for less than 25% of the Gross 
National Product of State A and then State B's contribution might be 
seen as too heavy. For these reasons it is my submission that the basis of 
172. Inter alia: A.N. SACK, op. cit. supra, note 165, p. 547; PAENSON, op. cit. supra, 
note 88, p. 22. 
173. Canada covers an area of 3,851,787 square miles. 
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population is not a good index for the determination of a fair proportion, 
because it ignores, like the territory-basis, important economic reali-
ties174. 
2.3.3. Economic indexes 
Indeed, it would seem that the best basis for repartition of the debt 
must depend on economic indexes. This idea is shared by the majority of 
publicists and does not have much opposition. However, once it is admit-
ted that the factor which ought to be considered is an economic one, 
divergences of opinion arise as to the right economic index which must be 
chosen. In this respect, it does not seem that any special economic factor 
has been recognized in the practice of States. 
For example, the great peace treaties of 1919-20 apply the revenues 
method; indeed, the Treaty of Versailles provides that: 
The powers to which German territory is ceded shall (. . .) undertake to pay a 
portion of the debt of the German Empire as it stood on August 1st, 1914, 
calculated on the basis of the ratio between the average for the three financial 
years 1911, 1912, 1913 of such revenues of the ceded territory and the average for 
the same years of such revenues of the whole German Empire as in the judgment 
of the Reparation Commission are best calculated to represent the relative ability 
of the respective territories to make payments.175 
But the difference of terminology used in these treaties shows that the 
revenues index is not as easy as it would appear at first sight. The Treaty 
of Versailles, like the Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon, deals with 
such revenues as represent the relative ability of the respective territories 
to make payments; on the contrary, the Treaties of Neuilly, Sèvres and 
Lausanne speak of the "total revenues"176. This difference is important 
because it governs the practical operation of computing these revenues. 
Indeed, the question can be asked whether all revenues have to be consi-
dered or only certain kinds of revenues. If an "all revenues" system is to 
174. It should be noted that Quebec's population (27%) corresponds with its contribution to 
the Gross National Product (24.4% in 1975). 
175. Treaty of Versailles, Art. 254, in: ISRAEL, op. cit. supra, note 34, Vol. II, p. 1422. See 
also Treaty of Neuilly, Art. 141; Treaty of St-Germain, Art. 203(2). In providing for 
the distribution of the Ottoman public Debt, the Treaty of Lausanne established also 
that territories detached from Turkey after the Balkan Wars and World War I were to 
assume liability for both the annuity and capital of the debt in the same proportion as 
the average total revenue of each detached territory for the fiscal years 1910-1911 and 
1911-1912 bore to average total revenue of the Ottoman Empire for those two years 
(Art. 49 and 51(1)). 
176. Treaty ofLausanne, Art. 51: Treaty of Sevres, Art. 243. 
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be adopted, this index may involve glaring injustices; indeed, the total 
amount of these revenues depends on the former economic and political 
organization and it is not necessarily true that the new State will enjoy the 
same revenues in the future. Moreover, new expenditures shall be en-
countered by the new State, such as the establishment of an army, the 
setting up of new institutions, and so on. Therefore, an all revenues 
method can be very unfair because it ignores the actual financial capacity 
of the secessionnist population. Does this mean that a selective approach 
is to be preferred? Tax revenues can offer a better basis, possibly. In this 
case, the only index which would be considered would be the percentage 
of taxes paid to the central State by the seceding territory. Another possi-
ble index would be a method based on budgetary revenues collected by 
the predecessor State from the seceding area. However, these last two 
approaches have a close connection with the number of inhabitants: an 
over-populated territory would have to pay more than a less populated 
area, everything else being equal. 
In reality, a review of the different principles on which the proportion 
of the debt ought to be taken over by the successor State appears to be a 
frustrating exercice. There is no scientific method for this purpose and 
each factor, when taken individually, is subject to criticism. I believe that 
professor O'Connell is basically right when he writes: 
The only principle that emerges from a consideration of all the possible tests is 
that the distributive key must be related to what Sack calls "the contributive 
force of each part of dismembered territory" and this contributive force can only 
be realized by a consideration of all the possible influential factors.177 
This point is really the boundary beyond which jurists must give way to 
economists. Once it is admitted that the successor State should assume a 
part of the public debt and that its financial contribution should be related 
to some economic index, the work which has to be done later depends 
more on a slide-rule than on legal rules. Sack's merit consists in the fact 
that he was the first publicist who pointed out that a financial contribution 
should be based on economic keys. However, his attempt at defining how 
one should apply his notion of contributive force contains so many 
reservations, so many exceptions and so many qualifications that it is 
difficult to imagine how it could be applied in practice. By definition, an 
equitable solution must take into account the concrete facts of each par-
ticular case and no general rule, consequently, can be elaborated be-
forehand. 
177. O'CONNELL, op. cit. supra, note 7, p. 456. 
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That being so, one might consider that a combination of different 
indexes could produce better results than the application of only one of 
them. For example, the financial contribution could be fixed as follows: 
— Population 26% 
— Contribution to the G.N.P. 24% 
— Contribution from tax revenues 18% 
— Budgetary revenues collected from the successor State by the predecessor 
State 22% 
— Other combined indexes 20% 
Average : 22% 
N.B. : these data are given by way of illustration only. 
From this average, there is ground for subtracting loss of benefits as a 
result of secession, increase of expenditures required by the creation of a 
new sovereign State and advantages and privileges granted to the pre-
decessor State. There would also be ground for adding to this total a fair 
proportion of the market value of federal buildings taken over by the new 
State, and generally, of elements of assets which have an economic value. 
Above all, the main consideration should be that the secessionnist State 
must not be put into a better or worse situation after secession, and that 
its relative paying capacity must be evaluated in the light of all possible 
important factors. As Feilchenfeld put it: 
No single test actually leads to justice but all relevant principles of justice must 
be considered if equity is to be achieved. Justice, distinguished from positive 
law, has in view not individual technical theories but fairness of total and final 
results.178 
On the whole, the general principle which seems to follow from the 
above considerations is that- the parties should tend to bring about a 
general settlement based on relative rather than absolute data. If we bear 
in mind that the successor State is not strictly bound to assume the sligh-
test part of the general debt, it could then be very difficult for the pre-
decessor State to require a settlement based on a precise investigation of 
profit and loss. Above all, it is essential that justice should be done and 
justice is not necessarily the outcome of a book-keeping operation. 
General conclusion 
In the event of Quebec's secession, the following rules can be estab-
lished regarding the general problem of State succession to public prop-
erty and debt. First, the new independent State will succeed to all federal 
178. FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra, note 111, p. 869. 
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public property which is located within the Province of Quebec. This rule 
means that lands and buildings belonging to the Federal Government or to 
a federal Crown corporation will pass automatically to the successor State 
on Independence Day. This also means that the new State will succeed to 
moveable property and incorporeal rights which were vested in the fed-
eral Crown; indeed, it seems to be a rule of international law that the 
successor State is entitled to take over public funds and various assets 
which are closely linked to its territory and, furthermore, to collect taxes 
which have not been paid to the former State. As a matter of law, "public 
property" would mean also "rights and interests". Moreover, at the 
same time as it takes possession of this public property, there appears to 
be no legal obligation to pay a fair compensation to the predecessor State. 
As has been pointed out, the old distinction between private and public 
domain is inapplicable in this case and, therefore, the predecessor State 
could not claim some compensation on that doctrinal basis. In regard to 
public debt the most conservative theory seems to be that the successor 
State does not have to assume a proportional share of the general and 
unsecured public debt of the predecessor State The rationale underlying 
this point of view lies in the fact that the predecessor State remains in 
existence and is still responsible towards its creditors despite the loss of a 
part of its territory However this theory asserts that the new State has 
the general obligation to assume debts which had been contracted for its 
exclusive benefit: indeed traditional doctrine assimilates these 
"localised" debts to pure local debts From a general viewpoint it must 
be admitted that the negative theory is widely supported by the practice of 
States; since 1960 no cases can be found where a dependent territory had 
to take over a part of the British or French general debt 
As far as it was possible to investigate the matter, the foregoing 
statements appear to be correct regarding present international law. 
However, it should not be forgetten that the results are rather peculiar: 
on the one hand, the new State could take over all rights, but on the other 
hand it would assume no obligation at all. There can be no doubt that such 
results correspond completely with positive doctrines oh international 
law: first, by virtue of its territorial sovereignty, the secessionist State can 
appropriate for itself everything which belonged to the predecessor State; 
second, by virtue of its new international personality, the new State can-
not be held responsible for the debts of another international person. 
Although the theories stated above are perfectly clear and logical, 
they still have the major disadvatange of rationalizingposJ/acfo practices 
which took shape in the turmoils of wars of conquest. Once international 
law recognized the right of a State to conquer another State, it was easy to 
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conclude that the property of conquered States falls to the victor and that 
there is no obligation upon the conqueror to assume, the financial obli-
gations of the conquered State. Ex facto jus oritur. One must say, at the 
same time, that these theories have served the interests of newly inde-
pendent States very well since 1960. However, the period of decoloniza-
tion is terminated and it is questionable whether the old doctrines can be 
relied upon to solve problems which arise in a different economic and 
political context. It is my belief that the tabula rasa principle should be 
relegated to the past and that the law of State succession should tend to 
bring "(• • •) the reconciliation of the independence of successor States 
with the expectations of other States". . .179. In this respect, it is interest-
ing to note the great divergence of practice with regard to the succession 
both to public property and to public debts. 
For example, the traditional distinction between public and private 
domain of States simply means that questions of compensation are not so 
crystal clear as they would appear to be at first sight. Although one agrees 
that the successor State has no obligation to offer compensation for the 
lands that it takes over, the case is still debatable concerning properties 
which have a real economic value. For instance, it is not sure that the 
federal State would easily give up Air Canada property which is located in 
Quebec. Moreover, the territorial link qualification is not always self-
evident. How should the line be drawn in this matter? For example, are 
military vehicles closely linked with the territory? In reality, these ques-
tions merely suggest that proper solutions can be arrived at only within 
the framework of an agreement between the two parties concerning State 
property and financial matters. 
As has been seen, leading theories admit that the new State is not 
required to take over a certain portion of the national debt. The starting 
point of these theories is the protection of creditors' rights. But these 
theories are basically unjust for the predecessor State. It is my submission 
that the successor State should assume a part of the central debt, calcu-
lated on the basis of its actual economic resources. It is true that it is very 
difficult to present sound principles on which the proportion of the debt 
should be taken over; but the difficulty of the task should not be viewed as 
a valid excuse for putting it aside. As the International Court of Justice 
said in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 
there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take account of for 
the purpose of making sure that they apply équitables procedures, and more 
179. D.P. O'CONNELL, "Recent Problems of State Succession in Relation to New States", 
(1970) 11 R.C.A.D.I. 120. 
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often than not it is the balancing-up of all such considerations that will produce 
this result rather than reliance on one to the exclusion of all other. The problem 
of the relative weight to be accorded to different considerations naturally varies 
with the circumstances of the case.180 
In fact, there is no legal reason why a global settlement could not be 
reached concerning both public property and public debt, in the event of a 
secession in Canada. 
180. Op. cit. supra, note 8, par. 96. 
